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THE UNCERTAIN PATH OF CLASS ACTION LAW
Sergio ]. Campost
For the past ten terms the Supreme Court has increased its focus on the law of
class actions. In doing so, the Court has revised the law to better accord with a view
of the class action as an exception to an idealized picture of litigation. This
"exceptional" view of the class action has had a profound impact not only on class
action law, but on procedural and substantive law in general. However, in the
October 2015 term the Court decided three class action cases that support an
alternative, 'functional" view of the class action, one that does not view the class
action as exceptional, but as one of many equally permissible tools to serve the
objectives of substantive law. This alternative view has the potential to have a
similarly significant impact on the law, but it is not certain whether the Court will
further develop this alternative, especially given its most recent class action decisions.
This Article discusses the development of the "exceptional" view of the class action,
the awakening of a 'functional" alternative view, and the uncertain path ahead.
t Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. This Article benefited greatly from
comments I received at the SEALs Annual Conference and faculty workshops at Miami and
Cornell. I also want to thank Caroline Bradley, Kathleen Claussen, Kevin Clermont, Zach
Clopton, Charlton Copeland, Hanoch Dagan, Andrew Elmore, Owen Fiss, Maggie Gardner, Pat
Gudridge, Leigh Osofsky, Aziz Rana, Andres Sawicki, and Osamudia James for their comments.
I want to especially single out and thank Adam Zimmerman for pushing and refining many of
the ideas presented here. Curtis Osceola and Alyssa D'Bazo provided excellent research
assistance. I acknowledge that I drafted, along with Adam Zimmerman, amicus briefs in two
cases discussed in this Article-Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016) and
Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017). However, we received no compensation for our
work on those briefs and the views expressed here are solely my own. Of course, all errors are
mine.
2223
2224 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2223
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ......................................................... ......... ....................................... 2225
I. THE C LASS A CTION AS AN EXCEPTION ................................................................. 2229
A . Sources of the View .................................................................................... 2229
1. A m chem ....................................... ......... ...................................... 2229
2. O rtiz................................................................................................. 2232
3. A fterm ath........................................................................................ 2234
B. The Predom inance R equirem ent.............................................................. 2236
1. Statistical Evidence ........................................................................ 2237
2. Bifurcation ...................................................................................... 2243
3. The "Fraud-On-The-Market" Presumption.............................. 2246
C . D ue Process ........................................ ............ ........................................ 2248
1. Injunctive Relief ............................................................................. 2248
2. Monetary Remedies ............................. 2252
3. Individual D efenses ....................................................................... 2254
4. An Existential Threat to the Class Action.................................. 2256
D . Procedure and Substance .......................................................................... 2257
1. Rules Enabling A ct ........................................................................ 2257
2. A rbitration ...................................................................................... 2259
3. A rticle III......................................................................................... 2262
4. Substantive Law ............................................................................. 2264
II. A N A LTERNATIVE A W AKENS................................................................................. 2269
A . The Predom inance Requirem ent.............................................................. 2270
B. Entitlem ent to a "D ay in Court".............................................................. 2273
C . Substance and Procedure .......................................................................... 2276
D . The Functional View ................................................................................. 2283
III. THE U NCERTAIN PATH A HEAD ............................................................................. 2284
A . Recent Cases............................................................................................... 2284
B. The A llure of Individualism ...................................................................... 2294
C . Back to the Future...................................................................................... 2296
C ONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 2300
CLASS ACTION LAW
INTRODUCTION
It is always risky to discuss the current views of the Supreme Court
over any area of law. The Court's views are like riverbeds, which can dry
from inattention at times, or flood with focus, or shift into new and
unexpected directions. Moreover, like a riverbed, the Court's views can
create channels that draw water after dry periods, influencing the course
of the river when the Court's attention returns. It is difficult to chart the
causes of these ebbs and flows, but it is helpful to map the river to better
navigate it, to see what deep channels may still draw water, and,
perhaps, to cultivate channels into new directions.
This is particularly true of the Supreme Court's views on the class
action. Beginning in the October 2009 term, the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in a number of cases raising issues concerning the law
of class actions.' During this time period, Justice Scalia had an
enormous influence on the Supreme Court's understanding of the class
action device. This is reflected in the many majority and plurality
opinions he wrote in the class action cases decided during this period.2
This influence, in fact, can be traced to deep channels that Justice Scalia,
with the help of others, developed prior to this flood of attention.
One can also detect Justice Scalia's influence on class action law by
his absence. This is especially true of the October 2015 term, a term
which, unfortunately, saw the passing of Justice Scalia on February 13,
2016.3 During that term the Court decided three major class action
cases. The first, Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, was decided less than a
month before Justice Scalia's death and was his last class action case.4
1 Paul G. Karlsgodt & Dustin M. Dow, The Practical Approach: How the Roberts Court Has
Enhanced Class Action Procedure by Strategically Carving at the Edges, 48 AKRON L. REv. 883,
886-87 (2015) (noting that, beginning in "2009, . . . the Supreme Court started a string of
granting certiorari in several cases raising class-action-related issues each year").
2 These opinions include, in chronological order, (1) Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs.,
P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (plurality opinion); (2) AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepci6n, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); (3) Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); (4)
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012); (5) Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S.
27 (2013); and (6) American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
3 Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.htmll?-r=0 [https://
perma.cc/L2J6-3SL9].
4 Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) (decided on January 20, 2016).
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However, in Campbell-Ewald, Justice Scalia did not write the majority,
but dissented. Moreover, in the two cases that followed-Tyson Foods,
Inc. v. Bouaphakeos and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins6-the Court moved
further away from the view that has informed Justice Scalia's, and the
Court's, recent decisions on the class action.
7 The fact that this new path
occurred so quickly after Justice Scalia's death only confirms the
outsized influence he has had on the Court's class action jurisprudence.
This Article seeks, in part, to bring to light the view of the class
action that motivated Justice Scalia's, and the Court's, decisions prior to
his passing. This view is not unique to Justice Scalia, and can be traced
back to decisions made by the Court in the 1990s concerning class
actions and asbestos litigation,8 if not earlier.9 Indeed, this Article not
only sets forth this view, but traces the development of this view over
time, to arguably its apex just prior to the October 2015 term.
This view does not consider class actions per se unlawful, but it
does consider them to be an exception to a particular idealized view of
procedure. Specifically, under this "exceptional" view of class action, a
class action is seen primarily as an "economical" procedure that decides
issues collectively for the class.10 However, the class action cannot be
used if it would change what would have occurred in the "normal
process" of separate actions filed by each individual class member.11 Put
5 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016) (decided on Mar. 22, 2016).
6 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (decided on May 16, 2016).
7 For a full discussion of that shift, see infra Part II.
8 See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815 (1999).
9 Early precursors include such non-class action cases as Martin v. Wilks, where the Court
first endorsed the ideal of a "day in court." 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989).
10 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349 n.5 (2011) (noting that the
commonality requirement "serve[s] as [a] guidepost[] for determining whether under the
particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical," among other things)
(quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982)); see also Wal-Mart, 564
U.S. at 350 ("'What matters to class certification ... is not the raising of common 'questions'-
even in droves-but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers
apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.") (alterations in original) (quoting Richard A.
Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)).
11 See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott, 561 U.S. 1301, 1303 (Scalia, Circuit Justice 2010); see
also Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) ("The class action is 'an exception to the
usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only."')
(quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)).
[Vol. 40:22232226
CLASS ACTION LAW
another way, the Court has emphasized "our 'deep-rooted historic
tradition that everyone should have his own day in court,"'12 and the
class action is an "exception" that cannot frustrate that tradition without
great justification. 13
The "exceptional" status of the class action, and the purportedly
"deep-rooted tradition" upon which it is based, has had an enormous
impact on class action law. Indeed, this exceptional view is a threat to
the very existence of the class action itself, insofar as the Court has
slowly forgotten the utility of, and thus the justification for, the class
action procedure.
Critics of the Supreme Court's recent class action jurisprudence
have pushed back against this exceptional view of the class action by
highlighting the regulatory benefits of the class action in curtailing
wrongdoing committed against a large group of dispersed individuals. 14
Older class action decisions by the Court have also pointed out the
regulatory benefits of the class action.15 But these regulatory benefits
only appear to redound to persons outside the litigation, and thus, at
least at first glance, sacrifice the interests of the parties to some diffuse,
amorphous good.16 The regulatory benefits do not, without more,
counter the core appeal of the exceptional view. What makes the
exceptional view compelling is that it prioritizes the individual over the
12 Fibreboard, 527 U.S. at 846 (quoting Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762).
13 Comcast, 569 U.S. at 33.
14 See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124
YALE L.J. 3052 (2015); Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v.
Concepci6n, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rodgers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011).
15 See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat'1 Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) ("The aggregation
of individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the
existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government."); U.S. Parole
Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402-03 (1980) (highlighting "[t]he justifications that led to
the development of the class action," which "include[d] ... the provision of a convenient and
economical means for disposing of similar lawsuits, and the facilitation of the spreading of
litigation costs among numerous litigants with similar claims.") (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23
Advisory Committee notes to the 1966 amendments); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 161 (1974) (noting small size of antitrust claims, concluding that "[njo competent attorney
would undertake this complex antitrust action to recover so inconsequential an amount.
Economic reality dictates that petitioner's suit proceed as a class action or not at all.").
16 See Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1167
(2009) (describing "inadequate deterrence" as a "more diffuse harm to society as a whole").
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group, and thus seeks to prevent the collective from running roughshod
over the individual's rights and interests.
As argued in more detail below, the three class action decisions of
the October 2015 term have awakened an alternative to the exceptional
view of the class action, one that takes on the core appeal of the
exceptional view directly. Under this nascent alternative view, the class
action is not an exception to an idealized, individualized procedure.
Instead, the alternative view recognizes that such individualized
procedures can be dysfunctional in some contexts, and in those contexts
the class action may be a solution to that dysfunction. Accordingly,
under this alternative view, the class action is not an imperfect
procedure to be constrained but a solution that alleviates the problems
that may arise from the very individualized procedures that the
exceptional view regards as ideal.
More importantly, this alternative view does not differ from the
exceptional view's concern with protecting the interests of each
individual class member from being subordinated to the interests of the
collective. They only differ in what those rights are and how they should
be protected. Under the exceptional view, the procedural ideal of
separate actions by individual victims has an enormous influence on
what rights get protected in the first place. If the right cannot be
protected by the procedural ideal, then it is not protected.
The alternative view, in contrast, takes substantive rights as they
are, and tailors the procedure to ensure their protection. Unlike the
exceptional view, the functional view does not idealize any procedure.
Instead, it sees procedure as subservient to the rights and interests that
are implicated in a given case. In other words, if, under the exceptional
view, function follows an imagined, idealized form, then under this
alternative view, form follows, and is subsidiary to, the function the law
is trying to achieve.
Accordingly, a further goal of this Article is to describe the
awakening of this alternative, functional view of the class action. The
awakening is subtle and fragile, and, as discussed below, it may simply
be an aberration in the Court's march to full adoption of the exceptional
view of the class action. Indeed, the awakening can easily be reconciled
with the exceptional view depending on the choices the Court makes
going forward. As discussed below, the Court's most recent class action
[Vol. 40:22232228
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decisions, most notably Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, have been, at best,
agnostic with respect to these two different views.17
But the awakening also presents an opportunity for the Court to
adopt the functional view, a view that, as argued below, is more
appealing than the exceptional view and opens up other avenues of
procedural innovation. It is also a view of the class action that better
accords with the history and the purposes of the class action. In many
ways, this nascent functional alternative is a throwback to a different era
when courts were more willing to experiment with procedure for
substantive ends. Thus, like the exceptional view, this alternative,
functional view has its own deep channels.
The Article begins by discussing the development of the
exceptional view in the Court's recent class action decisions. It then
discusses the awakening of an alternative, functional conception of the
class action based upon the Court's class action decisions during the
October 2015 term. The third Part discusses the uncertain path forward
for the alternative, functional view, its promise and historical support,
and the roadblocks ahead. The Article then concludes.
I. THE CLASS ACTION AS AN EXCEPTION
A. Sources of the View
1. Amchem
Although precursors do exist,18 the source of the Court's current
exceptional view can be traced to two class action decisions involving
17 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S.
Ct. 1702 (2017); Cal. Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. (CalPERs) v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017).
For a fuller discussion of these recent cases, see infra Section III.A.
18 The most notable is Martin v. Wilks, a Title VII case in which the Court addressed
disparate impact claims made by black firefighters against the City of Birmingham, Alabama,
fire department. 490 U.S. 755, 759 (1989). Nonparty white firefighters sought to intervene after
issuance of a consent decree, even though the firefighters were invited to help craft the decree
prior to its issuance. Id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court permitted intervention,
referring for the first time to the "deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his
own day in court." Id. at 762 (majority opinion). The case would later be abrogated by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-76 (codified as
2019] 2229
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the global settlement of asbestos claims-Amchem Products v. Windsorl9
and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.20 In Amchem, decided in 1997, the Court
reviewed a global settlement of asbestos claims that would settle the
unfiled claims of those presently injured and those who had been
exposed to asbestos but "had not yet manifested any asbestos-related
condition."21 The settlement was reached through the vehicle of a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3) settlement-only class
action, with the motion for certification of that class action filed literally
the same day as the complaint and the settlement itself.22
As brief background, Rule 23 governs federal class actions, and
under Rule 23, all class actions must satisfy the four prerequisites under
Rule 23(a)23 and must fit into "at least one of the three [categories of
class actions] listed in Rule 23(b)."24 Rule 23(b)(3) sets forth the third
category, a residual category of class actions primarily designed for
damage claims.25 Under Rule 23(b)(3), a class action can only be
certified if issues common to the class "predominate" over individual
issues and that the class action is "superior" to other alternatives.26
In Amchem, the Court vacated certification of the class, in part,
because common issues of law and fact did not predominate.27 The
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)(1) (2018)). The Court would later invoke this "day in court"
tradition in Richards v. Jefferson County, a case decided the year before Amchem, in which the
Court held that a prior taxpayer challenge to state statute did not bind a subsequent challenge
brought by different taxpayers who were not parties to the previous action. 517 U.S. 793, 798
(1996).
19 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
20 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
21 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 603-04.
22 Id. at 601-02 ("[Wlithin the space of a single day, January 15, 1993, the settling parties-
CCR defendants and the representatives of the plaintiff class described below-presented to the
District Court a complaint, an answer, a proposed settlement agreement, and a joint motion for
conditional class certification.").
23 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a). These prerequisites are (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3)
typicality, and (4) adequacy of representation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)-(4).
24 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
23(b)(1)-(3).
25 See Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty
& Maritime Claims Rules of Criminal Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966) (discussing the
creation of Rule 23(b)(3) subdivision).
26 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
27 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)).
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Court, quoting the Third Circuit's earlier decision in the case,
highlighted the many issues that were unique to each class member-
"[c]lass members were exposed to different asbestos-containing
products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, and over
different periods. Some class members suffer no physical injury or have
only asymptomatic pleural changes, while others suffer from lung
cancer, disabling asbestosis, or from mesothelioma."28 Here the Court
pointed to the Advisory Committee notes to the 1966 Amendments to
Rule 23, which noted that "'mass accident' cases" are "ordinarily not
appropriate" for certification given that they "are likely to present
'significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses
of liability, . . . affecting [] individuals in different ways."'29
Moreover, the Court distinguished mass tort claims like asbestos
claims from litigation involving small claims against a common
defendant. The Court noted that "[t]he policy at the very core of the
class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo
action prosecuting his or her rights."30 In contrast to such small claims
litigation, mass tort claims tend to have large expected recoveries, and
thus "[e]ach plaintiff... has a significant interest in individually
controlling the prosecution of' her case.31 Again the Court pointed to
the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 23, which noted that "[t]he
interests of individuals in conducting separate lawsuits may be so strong
as to call for denial of a class action."32 Given the size and heterogeneous
nature of the claims involved in asbestos litigation, the Court concluded
that "certification cannot be upheld, for it rests on a conception of Rule
23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement irreconcilable with the Rule's
design."33
The Court also rejected certification of the class because of a
fundamental conflict between the "presents," or those presently injured,
who the Court concluded preferred "generous immediate payments,"
and "exposure-only" plaintiffs, who, in the Court's view, preferred "an
28 Id. (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626 (3d Cir. 1996)).
29 Id. at 625 (first alteration in original).
30 Id. at 617 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
31 Id. at 616 (quoting Georgine, 83 F.3d at 633).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 625.
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ample, inflation-protected fund for the future."34 The Court, in
particular, was concerned that the presents would not adequately
represent the interests of the exposure-only plaintiffs. Accordingly, the
Court concluded that the class action failed to satisfy the "adequacy of
representation" prerequisite of Rule 2335 because there was "no
structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse
groups and individuals affected."36
2. Ortiz
In Amchem, the Court noted as an aside that "[a]lthough this [case]
is not a 'limited fund' case certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the terms of
the settlement reflect essential allocation decisions designed to confine
compensation and to limit defendants' liability."37 Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
defines a second category of class actions to cover situations when
separate actions "as a practical matter, would be dispositive of the
interests of the other members .. . or would substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests."38
Two years later, in Ortiz,39 the Court reviewed a slightly different
global asbestos settlement that was clearly informed by the above dicta
in Amchem. The parties in Ortiz apparently viewed this language as an
invitation to seek certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), rather than Rule
23(b)(3). Class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) provide an
additional advantage for plaintiffs' attorneys. Unlike class actions
certified under Rule 23(b)(3), Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions do not
require the provision of notice and an opportunity to opt out to the class
members.40
34 Id. at 626.
35 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
36 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626-28.
37 Id. at 626-27.
38 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
39 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
40 See FED. R. Cv. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (providing that, for classes certified under 23(b)(1) and
(b)(2), the court "may," but not must, "direct appropriate notice to the class" and further is not
required to provide class members an opportunity to opt out). Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)
(requiring such notice and opt out rights for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions).
[Vol. 40:22232232
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Despite its expansive language, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions have
been used primarily in litigation involving "limited fund[s]" or litigation
where the fund cannot satisfy all of the class members' claims.41 In those
circumstances, a mandatory class action is certified to prevent class
members from winning a race to the courthouse and exhausting the
fund.42 In Ortiz, the parties sought to characterize the settlement
amount as a "limited fund" insofar as it was limited to proceeds from a
specific insurance contract.43
In examining the proposed settlement, the Court engaged in a long
historical exegesis of the use of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions in limited
fund contexts. Here, the Court rejected the parties' characterization of
the case as involving a true limited fund because "Fibreboard was
allowed to retain virtually its entire net worth."44 Moreover, the Court
identified a fundamental conflict similar to the one in Amchem that
would equally result in inadequate representation-the interests of the
class attorney vis-a-vis the class. The Court noted, in particular, that
"[iln a strictly rational world, plaintiffs' counsel would always press for
the limit of what the defense would pay. But with an already enormous
fee within counsel's grasp, zeal for the client may relax sooner than it
would in a case brought on behalf of one claimant."45
Consequently, the Ortiz Court vacated certification of the class,
concluding that, despite the expansive language of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the
rule should be limited to its historical use and no more, especially givefi
the "likelihood of abuse" as evidenced by the asbestos settlement before
it.46 As put by the Court, "[t]he prudent course, therefore, is to presume
41 Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 834 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23 Advisory Committee notes to 1966
amendments).
42 See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REv. 183, 186
n.10 (describing Rule 23(b)(1)(B) as a form of "interpleader" designed to prevent races to the
courthouse).
43 Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 828. Specifically, Fibreboard was involved in separate insurance
coverage litigation of asbestos claims made against the company. Fibreboard, the insurer, and
the plaintiffs' attorneys agreed to a settlement that created a limited trust to pay off claims while
removing the risk that the insurance coverage litigation would result in no coverage. Id. at 823-
25.
44 Id. at 859.
45 Id. at 852 n.30.
46 Id. at 842.
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that when subdivision (b)(1)(B) was devised to cover limited fund
actions, the object was to stay close to the historical model."47
Finally, the Ortiz Court was not pleased with the mandatory nature
of the proposed Rule 23(b)(1)(B) settlement. Here the Court explicitly
characterized the class action as an exception to "the due process
'principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that
one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he
is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by
service of process."'48 In the Court's view, upholding the class action
would raise serious due process concerns because "objectors to the
collectivism of a mandatory subdivision (b)(1)(B) action have no
inherent right to abstain."49 According to the Court, failing to provide
such a right to abstain would run afoul of "our 'deep-rooted historic
tradition that everyone should have his own day in court."'50
3. Aftermath
In both Amchem and Ortiz, the Court provided the general
contours of the exceptional view of the class action. In fact, the Court in
Ortiz (1) explicitly identified a "day in court" ideal as an entitlement, (2)
identified the class action as an "exception" to that ideal, and (3)
concluded that "the burden of justification rests on the exception."51
Moreover, despite efforts by the Court in both cases to ground the
decisions in rule interpretation, the Amchem Court implicitly, and the
Ortiz Court explicitly, considered the "exceptional" view an outgrowth
of the law of due process.52
Although it lacks the explicitness of Ortiz, Amchem provides
content to what that "day in court" entails. At the very least, the day in
court ideal expresses a preference for a separate, tailored hearing on
47 Id.
48 Id. at 846 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)).
49 Id. at 846-47.
50 Id. at 846 (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989)).
51 Id.
52 Id.; see also Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions,
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 352 ("The fundamental strength of Amchem and Ortiz inheres in the




every issue of material fact or law that affects a party. This preference is
especially strong when the claims are large. The danger of departing
from this ideal is inadequate representation caused by either, in the case
of Amchem, a class member with conflicting interests or, as in Ortiz, the
class attorney's short-term greed.
Moreover, Amchem points to two justified exceptions to this ideal.
First, and most obviously, the class action does not conflict with the
ideal when issues common to the class predominate, which they did not
in the asbestos context. Presumably, if issues are the same for each class
member, then a separate hearing on that issue for each class member is
unnecessary. This suggests a kind of "outcome determinative" test for
the class action that is similar to the one under the Erie doctrine. Like in
the Erie context, under the exceptional view "the outcome of the
litigation in the [class action] should be substantially the same, so far as
legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if' the
class members filed separate actions on their own.53 Accordingly, a class
action does not run afoul of the "day in court" ideal if the class action
would mirror separate actions.
Second, separate hearings may not be required if the claims are too
small to give an incentive to a party to bring a lawsuit in the first place.
In such circumstances, the ideal is more "theoretic rather than
practical."54 The Amchem Court refers to this exception as the "policy at
the very core of the class action," as the claims would not otherwise be
brought absent he class action.55
Ortiz suggests a third exception-when, historically, representative
litigation was permitted, as in the case of limited funds.56 But, as the
decision in Ortiz makes clear, the Court was not willing to go beyond
53 Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) ("In essence, the intent of [the
Erie] decision was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction
solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the
federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a
litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court."); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467
(1965) (refining "outcome determinative" test, and similarly concluding that "[tlhe Erie rule is
rooted in part in a realization that it would be unfair for the character of result of a litigation
materially to differ because the suit had been brought in a federal court.").
54 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 616 (1997) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23
Advisory Committee notes to 1966 amendments).
55 Id. at 617.
56 Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 842.
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these historical anomalies. Again, "the burden of justification rests on
the exception."s? After laying down the groundwork of the exceptional
view in Amchem and Ortiz, the Court would start to revisit these
historical anomalies.
B. The Predominance Requirement
Although the Court in Amchem and Ortiz signaled its preference
for an exceptional view of the class action, both decisions left many
questions unanswered. One concerned the meaning of the
predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(3). When, exactly, do
common issues "predominate?" Do all of the issues have to be common,
or just a substantial amount and, if just some, how many?
The Court in Amchem provided two guideposts to the meaning of
"predominance." On the one hand, common issues did not predominate
in the asbestos litigation at issue in Amchem because the litigation
involved many large claims with many individual issues. However,
consistent with its effort to ground its decision on rule interpretation,
the Court also cited the Advisory Committee notes to the 1966
Amendments to Rule 23 to support its conclusion that "[p]redominance
is a test readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or securities fraud
or violations of the antitrust laws."58
When life gives plaintiffs' attorneys lemons, they make lemonade.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs' bar seized on this language in Amchem to
argue in favor of class certification in consumer, securities fraud, and
antitrust cases. But the exceptional view articulated in Amchem and
Ortiz is hard to square with the view that "predominance is .. . readily
met" in such actions. Like mass tort actions, consumer, securities fraud,
and antitrust cases typically involve individual issues of damages, all of
which are unique to each class member. Nevertheless, after Amchem,
but before the Court began to revisit class action law beginning in 2009,
"individual damage questions" in such litigation did "not preclude a
57 Id. at 846.




Rule 23(b)(3) class action when the issue of liability [was] common to
the class."59
1. Statistical Evidence
Given the blessing of Amchem, litigation outside of the mass tort
context continued to use two procedural tools to deal with individual
issues like damages. These tools were like the "limited fund" historical
anomaly in Ortiz-they somehow escaped the gravitational pull of the
exceptional view of the class action.
First, prior to Amchem and Ortiz, lower courts readily accepted the
use of statistical methods to determine individual issues in antitrust and
securities fraud cases. Such "mechanical" methods could determine
damages in the absence of an individual hearing for each class
member.60 Moreover, such methods did not have to accurately
determine damages for each class member "where such a formula may
be used to eliminate the need for individual proof of damages and thus
serve the ends of both justice and judicial economy."61 Second, in
antitrust, consumer, and employment discrimination litigation, lower
courts employed bifurcation, which allowed courts to decide common
issues like liability collectively and individual issues like damages on an
individual class member basis.62
59 6 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 18:27 (4th ed. 2002) (quoted in McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231
(2d Cir. 2008)); see also In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Export Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 28
(1st Cir. 2008) (an antitrust case, noting that "[p]redominance is not defeated by individual
damages questions as long as liability is still subject to common proof').
60 7 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 22:81 (5th ed. 2011) (observing that, in such cases, the determination of damages is
often "a mechanical task involving the administration of a formula"); see also Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[S]hould the class prevail the amount of price
inflation during the period can be charted and the process of computing individual damages
will be virtually a mechanical task.").
61 8 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 59, § 18:53 (noting that "the court should not
reject" class actions in the antitrust context due to inaccurate methods of assessing and
distributing damages).
62 See, e.g., 8 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 59, § 24:124 ("The majority of courts
have held the bifurcation of class liability and relief phases of Title VII suits to be an
appropriate means of litigating employment discrimination claims."); see also In re Visa
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001), overruled on other
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Prior to Amchem lower courts sought to apply the same statistical
and bifurcation procedures to mass tort litigation.63 However, appellate
courts often rejected the use of these procedures out of concern that the
procedures would gut the restrictions on class actions,
64 or cause juries
in the individual phase to re-examine factual findings in violation of the
Seventh Amendment.65 Amchem confirmed that the use of these
procedures were impermissible for mass tort class actions, rejecting, for
example, the settlement grids devised by the parties to distribute
proceeds to the class members.66
Yet, at the same time, Amchem grandfathered in the use of such
procedures for claims outside the mass tort context without articulating
a principled reason, other than the legislative history of Rule 23. The size
of the claim may appear to be a distinguishing factor, but antitrust and
securities fraud claims can be just as large as mass tort claims, if not
larger.67 Indeed, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA)68 presumes large claims in securities fraud litigation because it
grounds by In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006) ("In the event that
the district court does find conflicts [as to damage calculation] . . . there are a variety of devices
available to resolve the problem [including] . . . the possibilities of bifurcating liability and
damage trials."); Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.)
(citing Visa Check, 280 F.3d at 141) (affirming RICO class certification and suggesting
procedural mechanisms available at a later stage for individual issues such as damages and
bifurcation). In fact, Rule 23 permits certification as to common issues. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(4) ("When appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with
respect to particular issues.").
63 See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 658 (E.D. Tex. 1990)
(upholding and applying actual damage multiplier in scheduling of punitive damages); see also
David Rosenberg, Comment, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a
Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695 (1989) (discussing the use of damage grids and sampling in
Dalkon Shield and A.H. Robbins bankruptcy litigation of asbestos claims).
64 Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that issue
class actions would "eviscerate the predominance requirement of rule 23(b)(3); the result would
be automatic certification in every case where there is a common issue, a result that could not
have been intended.").
65 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J.) (noting
concern with reexamination in context of comparative negligence defenses).
66 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23
Advisory Committee notes to 1966 amendments).
67 John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 288, 309-10, 317 (2010) (noting large size of claims in antitrust and securities fraud
litigation).
68 Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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assigns the task of representing the class to a "lead plaintiff' who, among
other things, "has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the
class."69
As a result of Amchem, a new consensus emerged about the
predominance requirement, one that represented what can be called a
light version of the exceptional view. Under this consensus, the
predominance requirement mainly tests "resolvability," or the ability of
a court to "craft[] a judgment that specifies the rights of all class
members."7o Predominance is not readily met in mass tort litigation
because numerous individual issues prevent the court from effectively
resolving the class member's claims in one fell swoop. In contrast,
predominance is readily met in cases where the individual issues can be
determined mechanically through the use of grandfathered-in statistical
or bifurcation methods.71 In 2010, this "resolvability" interpretation of
predominance, along with the grandfathered-in exceptions, would be
adopted by the American Law Institute's (ALI) Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation.72
However, the grandfathered-in procedures that made antitrust,
securities fraud, and similar non-mass tort litigation resolvable
remained in considerable tension with the exceptional view outlined in
Amchem and Ortiz. Specifically, it was unclear why statistical methods
that averaged awards were tolerated at all, given that any amount of
69 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb) (2018); see also James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas &
Dana Kiku, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class
Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1588-89 (2006) (noting that in passing "lead plaintiff'
provisions, "Congress clearly envisioned that various financial institutions-pension funds,
insurance companies, and mutual funds-were the most likely types of investors who could
combine a large financial stake in the suit's outcome with the sophistication to guide the suit to
an appropriate result.").
70 Allan Erbsen, From "Predominance" to "Resolvability": A New Approach to Regulating
Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1027 (2005).
71 Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 831-32 (1997)
(noting this difference: "It is possible to divide the successful and unsuccessful class actions by
separating the cases involving economic harms on the one side from personal injuries on the
other. Nonetheless, there is something more to be learned from this than simply the distinction
between economic harms and personal injuries.").




averaging or sampling would, in most circumstances,
73 prevent a
tailored hearing of individual issues for some class members.
Consequently, the defense bar, sensing this tension, devised new
ways of attacking the grandfathered-in statistical procedures used in
non-mass tort cases. One particularly effective method of attack was to
raise the evidentiary standard for these methods at the class certification
stage. A major barrier to this strategy was dicta in an older Supreme
Court case, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, which found that there was
"nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court
any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit
in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action."74
Some lower courts relied upon this language in Eisen to decline
scrutinizing the statistical methods proposed to determine individual
issues like damages.75 They did so despite post-Eisen precedent
requiring a "rigorous analysis" of the certification requirements.
76
However, many circuits began to accept the view that such a merits
inquiry was appropriate when a merits issue "overlap [ped]" with a class
certification requirement like predominance.7? Moreover, by permitting
courts to scrutinize the sufficiency of the proposed statistical methods to
prove damages, the defense bar also pushed hard, and in many cases
successfully, to subject such methods to Daubert admissibility review
78
prior to class certification.79 Given the increased scrutiny of such proof,
73 The exception, of course, is a situation where averaging or sample evidence is used as
circumstantial evidence in an individual hearing. This distinction would have great significance
in the Court's reawakening of the class action. See infra Sections I.B, II.B.
74 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
75 See, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2001)
("Although a trial court must conduct a 'rigorous analysis' to ensure that the prerequisites of
Rule 23 have been satisfied before certifying a class, 'a motion for class certification is not an
occasion for examination of the merits of the case.'"); see also In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec.
Litig., 227 F.R.D. 65, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (same) (citing Visa Check and Eisen).
76 Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
77 See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig. 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006); Szabo v.
Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2001).
78 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (outlining standard for
admissibility of expert evidence).
79 See, e.g., Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(concluding that "the district court must perform a full Daubert analysis before certifying the
class if the situation warrants").
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the certification stage was effectively transformed into a trial on the
merits, in effect "putting the cart before the horse."so
This was the state of the law on predominance when the Court
decided Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,81 a decision that one defense
attorney described as "like an 8-year-old's Christmas morning in my
office!"82 The case itself was the perfect storm of the various
developments in the law of predominance, even though, ironically, the
class action at issue was not a Rule 23(b)(3) class action but a class
action under Rule 23(b)(2), which does not have a "predominance"
requirement.83
In Wal-Mart, the plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart's hiring and
promotion practices violated Title VII because the practices contained
excessive subjectivity that resulted in the discrimination of women in
pay and promotion decisions.84 In certifying the class, the district court
adopted a unique procedure for determining individual issues of
discrimination and pay that combined both statistical methods and
bifurcation. In essence, the district court would randomly sample a
subgroup of individual cases, decide them, and then use the results to
create a grid to determine the damages in all of the other claims, all
without affording any of those other claims a separate hearing.85 This
80 In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 32 (1st Cir. 2008)
(Torruella, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
81 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
82 Russell Jackson, Wal-Mart v. Dukes Opinion Will Have Far-Reaching Application in





application-in-class-action-defense]. Russell Jackson has since become a plaintiffs' attorney,
and thus now supports greater use of class actions. See Meet Russell Jackson, JACKSON
ADVOCATES LLC, http://jacksonadvocates.com/meet-russell-jackson [https://perma.cc/S9G4-
TDR8] (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).
83 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). Like Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and Rule 23(b)(3), Rule 23(b)(2)
defines a separate category of class actions which are permissible, in this case when the
plaintiffs seek "final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief' which applies to "the
class as a whole." Id. This aspect of the Wal-Mart decision is discussed later in this article. See
infra Section I.C.
84 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 344-45.
85 Id. at 367.
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statistical-bifurcation method was used for the first and only time in
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, a class action that preceded Amchem and
involved human rights claims against the former prime minister of the
Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos.86
The Hilao procedure provided much-needed administrative
efficiency in determining damages in Wal-Mart, which, at the time, was
"the largest employment discrimination lawsuit in American history."87
Moreover, bifurcation was an accepted practice of employment
discrimination cases since the 1970s,88 and, given that the case was not
certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court did not have to deal with the
issues surrounding the predominance requirement in the aftermath of
Amchem.
After class certification was affirmed en banc by a bitterly divided
Ninth Circuit,89 the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In deciding the
case, the Court brought non-mass tort litigation like employment
discrimination litigation closer to the exceptional view of the class
action. The Wal-Mart Court first blessed the trend, found in most
circuits, of permitting merits review at the class certification stage when
the merits overlapped with the class certification requirements.
90
Indeed, the Court noted in dicta that Daubert hearings on the
admissibility of expert evidence were appropriate.
91
The Court then maneuvered around the lack of a predominance
requirement by focusing on the "commonality" requirement, which
previously was a lenient requirement that only required a showing that
86 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782-87 (9th Cir. 1996).
87 Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart Asks Supreme Court to Hear Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
25, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/business/26walmart.html [https://perma.cc/
7TYT-QH6J].
88 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360-61 (1977) (noting that
after a "pattern-or-practice" has been found to violate Title VII, "a district court must usually
conduct additional proceedings after the liability phase of the trial to determine the scope of
individual relief").
89 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), reversed sub nom.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
90 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350-51.
91 Id. at 354 (noting that "the District Court concluded that Daubert did not apply to expert
testimony at the certification stage," but concluding that "[wie doubt that is so.").
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at least one issue of law or fact was common to the class.92 In discussing
commonality, the Court wholeheartedly accepted the "resolvability"
consensus, quoting an article by one of the reporters of the ALI's
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation to state that "[w]hat matters
to class certification .. . is not the raising of common 'questions'-even
in droves-but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate
common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation."93
As for the statistical-bifurcation method, the Court addressed it
summarily and brutally. The Court referred to the method pejoratively
as "Trial by Formula," and stated that "[w]e disapprove [ofJ that novel
project."94 The Court noted, in particular, that the method decided
claims based on its statistical sampling "without further individualized
proceedings."95 The Court also disapproved of the proposed "Trial by
Formula" because "Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory
defenses to individual claims."96 In other words, the Court rejected such
sampling because it failed to provide the "further individualized
proceedings" mandated by the "day in court" ideal.
2. Bifurcation
The Wal-Mart Court put into doubt whether a statistical method
could be approved for determining individual issues if it obviated
"further individualized proceedings" to decide individual issues like
affirmative defenses. The Court, however, left unanswered whether
bifurcation remained a viable alternative to provide those individualized
proceedings.
Indeed, it is unclear why bifurcation does not make the class action
consistent with the exceptional view in all cases, including mass torts.
92 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (only requiring that "there are questions of law or fact common
to the class"); see also James v. City of Dallas, 254 F.3d 551, 570 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The test for
commonality is not demanding. . . . All that is required for each class is that there is one
common question of law or fact.") (internal citations omitted). But see M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg
v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 839-40 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that James v. City of Dallas and other
"pre-Wal-Mart case law" was no longer good law with respect to commonality).
93 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 (quoting Nagareda, supra note 10, at 132).





This is because bifurcation guarantees the individual hearing on
individual issues that the "day in court" ideal demands. Aside from
Seventh Amendment Re-examination Clause concerns that are not
difficult to address,97 the antagonism towards bifurcation can be
understood by a "property" premise of the "exceptional" view-that the
claimholder owns their claim or defense, including the right to control
all aspects of their litigation. Accordingly, allowing a party some, but not
total, control over the claim is unacceptable.98
Nevertheless, the availability of bifurcation remained
grandfathered in for antitrust, securities fraud, and consumer cases, but
the Court put the plain, non-sampling use of bifurcation into doubt in a
case decided two years after Wal-Mart, Comcast v. Behrend.99 There, the
issue presented squarely asked "[w]hether a district court may certify a
class action without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced
admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is
susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis."100 In Comcast,
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant engaged in anticompetitive
conduct in acquiring near total control of the greater Philadelphia
consumer cable market and by preventing others from entering that
market.101 The plaintiffs alleged at least four theories supporting an
antitrust violation, and provided an expert report showing that both
classwide injury and individual damages could be proven on a common
basis.102 However, the district court only accepted one of the four
theories, and it was unclear whether the damage methodology could
isolate the injuries caused by that particular theory as opposed to the
others. 103
97 In particular, issues of liability concern the defendant's decision-making processes before
the tort occurred, while the issue of damages concerns the effect of the tort on the plaintiffs
after the tort occurred. This difference in time could serve as a guide in bifurcating issues. See
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA. L. REV. 1855, 1874-81 (2015)
(noting this distinction); Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059,
1072-74 (2012).
98 Again, this premise is discussed in more detail below. See infra Section I.C.
99 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34-41 (2013).
100 Id. at 39-40 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J., dissenting). The question presented would actually
transform substantially before the Court decided the case. See id.
101 Id. at 30-31 (majority opinion).




As noted earlier, under existing precedent, common proof of
individual damages was unnecessary in an antitrust class action because,
among other things, a court could simply bifurcate the proceedings and
determine damages on an individual basis at a later stage. However,
both the plaintiffs and Comcast conceded that common proof of
individual damages was necessary in this case, which forced the Court to
address the sufficiency of the proof at the class certification stage despite
precedent o the contrary.104
The Comcast Court ultimately vacated class certification and
remanded, concluding that the expert methodology for determining
individual damages failed to show which of the potential theories of
liability caused the damages to the class members.1os In so concluding,
the Court stated matter-of-factly that "[w]ithout presenting another
methodology, respondents cannot show Rule 23(b)(3) predominance:
Questions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm
questions common to the class."106 The majority made no mention of
the fact that bifurcation was a potential way of dealing with individual
issues in the antitrust context, and thus put the grandfathered-in status
of bifurcation into doubt.
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, sought to
preserve the grandfathered-in status of bifurcation for antitrust claims.
The dissent, in particular, cited a plethora of cases and sources,
including the dicta in Amchem, to support the conclusion that the
existence of individual damages issues in antitrust cases does not
prevent the certification of a class action. o7 Moreover, the dissent
pointed to the parties' concession on common proof of individual
damages to show that the Court "breaks no new ground" on whether the
predominance requirement requires a showing that all issues, including
individual damages issues, must be proven on a common basis.108
104 Id. at 30 (noting that this was "uncontested"); see also id. at 41 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
105 Id. at 38 (majority opinion).
106 Id. at 34.
107 Id. at 41 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing sources and concluding that
"[r]ecognition that individual damages calculations do not preclude class certification under




Accordingly, the dissent concludes that "[t]he Court's ruling is good for
this day and case only." 109
Despite their limitations, both Wal-Mart and Comcast brought the
Court's jurisprudence much closer to the exceptional view of the class
action. In essence, the Court, without deciding conclusively, cast
significant doubt on (1) whether any statistical methods that obviate a
party's day in court are permissible; and (2) whether bifurcation 
is a
viable procedure to preserve one's day in court. Because of both
decisions, Amchem's dicta about antitrust, securities fraud, and
consumer litigation appeared to be on its last legs, and this emboldened
the defense bar to seek the death blow.
3. The "Fraud-On-The-Market" Presumption
One doctrine that has been resistant to the Wal-MartlComcast
trend is the "fraud on the market" presumption. The presumption, first
articulated by the Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, permits a district court
to presume that the class members relied upon an alleged fraud or
misrepresentation as long as the security was traded on an efficient
market.11o The presumption was created to make it easier to certify
securities fraud class actions, because, in the absence of the
presumption, "[r]equiring proof of individualized reliance from each
member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would" prevent class
certification because "individual issues then would... overwhelm[] the
common ones.""'
As in other contexts involving the predominance requirement, the
defense bar sought to attack the fraud-on-the-market presumption by
increasing the evidentiary standard for its use at the class certification
stage. In Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.,112 for example, the
Fifth Circuit concluded below that any invocation of the fraud-on-the-
market presumption required proof by the plaintiffs at the class
certification stage of "loss causation," insofar as any invocation of the
presumption requires at least some initial proof that the alleged
109 Id. at 42.
110 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988).
111 Id. at 242.
112 563 U.S. 804 (2011).
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statement caused a loss.113 The Court rejected this requirement because
loss causation "has nothing to do with whether an investor relied on the
misrepresentation in the first place, either directly or presumptively
through the fraud-on-the-market heory."114
Similarly, in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust
Funds, the defendant argued that evidence of materiality was necessary
to establish the fraud-on-the-market presumption.n1 The Court again
rejected this proposed requirement, concluding that the materiality
requirement was both an element of the merits and an issue that was
common to the class. Accordingly, "[a]s to materiality, therefore, the
class is entirely cohesive: It will prevail or fail in unison," and thus proof
of materiality is unnecessary to show that "questions common to the
class predominate."1l6 Moreover, the Court cited the PSLRA, which did
not address the fraud-on-the-market presumption, as evidence that
"Congress rejected calls to undo the fraud-on-the-market presumption
of classwide reliance endorsed in Basic."'7
Notably, in Amgen, the majority opinion written by Justice
Ginsburg pushed back a bit against the "resolvability" interpretation of
predominance. She noted that "Rule 23(b)(3) requires a showing that
questions common to the class predominate, not that those questions
will be answered, on the merits, in favor of the class."ns Moreover, the
majority opinion noted that requiring proof of a merits issue like
materiality prior to class certification "would have us put the cart before
the horse," echoing a position expressed by dissenters in the lower
courts.n19
The pushback by Justice Ginsburg is unsurprising given that she
was the author of Amchem, and thus the author of the Amchem dicta
concluding that antitrust, securities fraud, and consumer class actions
readily meet the predominance test.120 It also explains the Court's weak
113 Id. at 811-12.
114 Id. at 813.
115 Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 459 (2013).
116 Id. 459-60.
117 Id. at 475-76.
118 Id. at 460.
119 Id. at 460; see also In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 32 (1st
Cir. 2008) (Torruella, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (same).
120 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997).
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defense of the fraud-on-the-market presumption. Rather than defend it
on the merits, Justice Ginsburg used the Ortiz tactic of employing
history and statutory interpretation to grandfather-in the presumption.
Unchastened, the defendant in the earlier Halliburton case next
challenged the fraud-on-the-market presumption directly as against
"congressional intent and . . . subsequent developments in economic
theory."121 Although the Court allowed for the presumption to be
rebutted at the class certification stage, it declined to get rid of the
presumption entirely.122 The Court, in particular, noted that "[b]efore
overturning a long-settled precedent, however, we require 'special
justification,' not just an argument that the precedent was wrongly
decided."123 In cases like Wal-Mart and Comcast, the Court displayed a
growing willingness to revisit anomalies to the exceptional view.
However, in the Halliburton cases, as in Ortiz, there remained certain
historical anomalies that the Court was not yet willing to revisit.
C. Due Process
In articulating its nascent exceptional view of the class action, the
Court in Amchem and Ortiz also left unanswered a second set of issues
relating to due process. If, according to Ortiz, mandatory class actions
take away a party's "inherent right to abstain" from the collectivism of
the class action, then could a mandatory class action ever be
permitted?124
1. Injunctive Relief
The exceptional view of the class action strongly suggests that the
answer to the above question is "no," although the Court did not answer
these questions conclusively prior to 2009. However, one case decided
just prior to Amchem and Ortiz, Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Brown,
121 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 269 (2014).
122 Id. at 279.
123 Id. at 266 (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)).
124 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846-47 (1999).
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suggested that the Court was at least aware of the issue. 125 In Ticor, the
Court examined a class action of title insurance claims certified under
Rule 23(b)(2), which, again, only applies to claims for classwide
injunctive or declaratory relief. 126 Although the claims in Ticor sought
injunctive and declaratory relief, the claims also sought monetary
damages. Because Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, like Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class
actions, do not require the court to give class members a right to opt
out, a class action was certified without such opt out rights. 127 The
claims were then tried and judgment was entered. A group of absent
class members who did not object to class certification prior to
judgment then argued that they had a constitutional right to an opt out
under the Due Process Clause, as well as a right to opt out under the
Rules themselves.128
In a per curiam decision, the Court avoided both issues, finding
(1) the parties were precluded by the judgment from attacking class
certification under the Rules; and (2) answering the constitutional issue
would not be wise if it turned out that class certification was improperly
granted, resulting in the Court reaching a constitutional question that it
did not necessarily have to answer.129 In dissent, Justice O'Connor,
joined by then-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, disagreed
with the Court's ducking of the constitutional issue, pointing out that,
"[u]nless and until a contrary rule is adopted, courts will continue to
certify classes under Rules 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) notwithstanding the
presence of damages claims."130
Justice O'Connor was indeed right that, following Ticor, Rule
23(b)(2) class actions would continue to be certified that included
claims for damages or similar monetary relief. Indeed, lower courts
found further support for such hybrid class actions for injunctive
relief/damage relief by implication. The Advisory Committee notes to
125 511 U.S. 117 (1994).
126 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
127 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (providing that, for classes certified under 23(b)(1) and
(b)(2), the court "may," but not must, "direct appropriate notice to the class," and further is not
required to provide class members an opportunity to opt out); see also Ticor, 511 U.S. at 120-
21.
128 Ticor, 511 U.S. at 120-21.
129 Id. at 122.
130 Id. at 124 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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the 1966 Amendments to Rule 23 state that Rule 23(b)(2) "does not
extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or
predominantly to money damages," implying that claims for money
damages may be present in a Rule 23(b)(2) so long as they do not
predominate.131 Moreover, Title VII contains a make whole provision
that entitles plaintiffs to backpay, which, though monetary in nature, is
considered an equitable remedy akin to injunctive relief.132 Taken
together, some circuits began to permit the certification of Rule 23(b)(2)
injunctive relief class actions asserting Title VII claims that also
included claims for backpay.133
This is how the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart avoided the predominance
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). In moving to certify a class, the plaintiffs
sought to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2) seeking "injunctive and
declaratory relief, lost pay, and punitive damages," but not "any
compensatory damages on behalf of the class."134 The district court
certified the Rule 23(b)(2) class with some modifications, allowing the
certification of backpay claims "except that class members for whom
there is no available objective data documenting their interest in
challenged promotions shall be limited to injunctive and declaratory
relief with respect to plaintiffs' promotion claim."135
In Wal-Mart, the Court rejected the certification of the backpay
claims under Rule 23(b)(2)136 and, in doing so, made some headway in
answering some of the questions left unanswered in Ticor. The Court
first noted that the Rule 23(b)(2) only applies when the remedy is
"indivisible," again citing an influential article by the reporter to the
131 Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 25, at 102; see also Allison v. Citgo
Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 411 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 23 Advisory
Committee notes to 1966 amendments on this point).
132 See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 170 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see also
Gotthardt v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 191 F.3d 1148, 1152-55 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing
that backpay is equitable relief); Allison, 151 F.3d at 415 ("Back pay, of course, had long been
recognized as an equitable remedy under Title VII."); Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 92
(D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[I]t is not uncommon in employment discrimination [(b)(2)] cases for the
class also to seek monetary relief in the form of back pay or front pay.").
133 See, e.g., Allison, 151 F.3d at 425; see also Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co.,
267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (permitting monetary claims based on "ad hoc balancing").
134 Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 141.
135 Id. at 188.
136 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011).
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ALI's Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation for this principle.137
Moreover, citing Ortiz, the Court relied upon "historical models on
which the Rule was based" to conclude that Rule 23(b)(2), which was
modeled on civil rights cases involving injunctive relief, did not
contemplate certification of claims for individualized relief.138
Finally, the Court noted that the structure of Rule 23(b)
demonstrated that only claims involving indivisible remedies like
injunctions, declaratory relief, and limited funds were entitled to
mandatory class actions. In contrast, claims for more individualized,
divisible relief required "[lt]he procedural protections attending the
(b)(3) class-predominance, superiority, mandatory notice, and the
right to opt out."139 The fact that backpay claims are "equitable" in
nature, was, in the Court's view, "irrelevant," because "[t]he Rule does
not speak of 'equitable' remedies generally but of injunctions and
declaratory judgments."40
At first glance, the Court in Wal-Mart suggests a type of
grandfathered-in enclave of mandatory class actions that do not require
the notice and opt-out rights provided by Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.
Accordingly, to the extent the exceptional view of the class action
requires a party to retain an "inherent right to abstain" from the
collectivization of the class action, that right is subject to historically
accepted exceptions like civil rights cases and, as identified in Ortiz, true
limited fund cases. 141
However, the Wal-Mart Court did provide a strong hint that the
Court was willing to revisit this grandfathered-in enclave in the future.
In discussing the mandatory nature of a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, the
Court stated the following:
[Rule] (b)(2) does not require that class members be given notice and
opt-out rights, presumably because it is thought (rightly or wrongly)
that notice has no purpose when the class is mandatory, and that
depriving people of their right to sue in this manner complies with
the Due Process Clause. In the context of a class action
137 Id. (citing Nagareda, supra note 10, at 132).
138 Id. at 361.
139 Id. at 362.
140 Id. at 365.
141 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846-47 (1999).
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predominantly for money damages we have held that absence of
notice and opt-out violates due process. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 86 L. Ed.2d 628 (1985).
While we have never held that to be so where the monetary claims do
not predominate, the serious possibility that it may be so provides an
additional reason not to read Rule 23(b)(2) to include the monetary
claims here.1
42
Here the Court sends a signal that it is not completely convinced that
mandatory class actions are justified in the context of claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2). Although the
Court parrots the "indivisibility" justification for the differential
treatment, it adds a caveat, "rightly or wrongly," that strongly hints that
it is open to rethinking the wisdom of that justification.
2. Monetary Remedies
In the above passage, the Wal-Mart Court also stated matter-of-
factly that, as a matter of due process, a class action "predominantly for
money damages" requires the provision of notice and opt out rights for
class members. The Court had never held this before, not even in Ortiz.
Although the Court cited Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts as
support for this proposition, the Shutts Court only held that the
provision of notice and opt out rights was sufficient for a state court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over absent class member plaintiffs.143
Although the Shutts Court discussed opt out rights as a "minimal
procedural due process protection," the case was never read so broadly
as to require, as a matter of constitutional law, that all class actions
"predominantly" involving monetary remedies require notice and opt
out rights.144 Admittedly, the Court in Ticor, decided after Shutts,
addressed the far broader issue of whether "absent class members have a
constitutional due process right to opt out" even in class actions where
the claims are not predominantly for monetary damages. However, in
analyzing (or, more accurately, avoiding) the issue, the Ticor Court
142 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 363 (emphasis added).




failed to even cite Shutts, and it is safe to say that, prior to 2011, no one
thought that Shutts had this due process implication.145
This would not be the first time in 2011 that the Court would cite
Shutts for the proposition that class actions involving monetary
remedies require the provision of notice and an opportunity to opt out.
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepci6n, an arbitration case decided two
months before Wal-Mart, the Court cited Shutts for the proposition that
"[flor a class-action money judgment to bind absentees in litigation,
class representatives must at all times adequately represent absent class
members, and absent members must be afforded notice, an opportunity
to be heard, and a right to opt out of the class."146 In fact, in AT&T, the
Court used Shutts to expand beyond court-oriented litigation, stating
that "[a]t least this amount of process would presumably be required for
absent parties to be bound by the results of arbitration."47
In another case decided in 2011, Smith v. Bayer Corp., the Court
addressed whether a party could be enjoined from filing a class action
when a class action filed by a different party in a different court was
denied certification. 148 The Court concluded that the party could not be
enjoinedl49 without addressing the party's argument that "based on
[Shutts], . . . the District Court's action violated the Due Process
Clause."150
However, the Bayer Court did suggest some sympathy to this due
process ground by stating that "[w]e have repeatedly 'emphasize[d] the
fundamental nature of the general rule' that only parties can be bound
by prior judgments,"isi and that allowing for nonparty preclusion
outside the context of Rule 23 "would "recogniz[e], in effect, a common-
law kind of class action . .. shorn of [Rule 23's] procedural
145 See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 120-21 (1994).
146 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepci6n, 563 U.S. 333, 349 (2011) (citing Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985)) (emphasis added).
147 Id.
148 564 U.S. 299 (2011).
149 Although this holding is a natural extension of the exceptional view, it was still contrary
to some case law permitting such preclusion in some contexts. See Kevin M. Clermont, Class
Certification's Preclusive Effects, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 203 (2011) (discussing this
caselaw).
150 Smith, 564 U.S. at 308 n.7.
151 Id. at 313 (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 898 (2008)).
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protections."152 In essence, the Bayer Court's reasoning suggests that
Rule 23 is commensurate with due process requirements, and these
include Rule 23(b)(3)'s right to an opt out. Indeed, in support of these
propositions the Court cited Taylor v. Sturgell, a preclusion case where
the Court again invoked the "deep-rooted historic tradition that
everyone should have his own day in court."153 It should therefore come
as no surprise that the Bayer Court, at the very least, acknowledged
Shutts as a possible ground for this view of due process, even if it did not
address the issue.
3. Individual Defenses
Finally, this strong suggestion that due process requires class
actions involving monetary remedies (and maybe all remedies) to
provide notice and opt out rights dovetails with the Court's rejection of
statistical methods discussed earlier. Again, as noted above, the Wal-
Mart Court rejected the proposed "Trial by Formula" because it would
prevent the defendants from asserting individualized affirmative
defenses against certain plaintiffs.154 In both situations, the Court
strongly implies that parties are entitled to control their claims or
defenses.
This line of reasoning in Wal-Mart was foreshadowed by the
insistence by many lower courts in earlier decisions on some proof at
the certification stage that all of the class members were, in fact,
injured.5S Such a "proof of classwide injury" requirement achieved the
practical goal of ensuring that there were no uninjured members of the
class, a goal that would later resurface as a certification requirement that
the class members are "ascertainable."156 More importantly, proof of
152 Id. at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted) (first and last alteration in original)
(quoting Taylor, 553 U.S. at 901).
153 Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892-93 (quoting Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798
(1996)).
154 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011).
155 For a discussion of this case law, see Sergio J. Campos, Proof of Classwide Injury, 37
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 751 (2012).
156 See, e.g., Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593-94 (3d Cir. 2012)




classwide injury implicated due process concerns-"actual injury cannot
be presumed,.. . [because] defendants have the right to raise individual
defenses against each class member."157
Despite the Court's decisions in Wal-Mart, AT&T, and Bayer, the
Court failed to address squarely the issue of whether due process
required party control of claims and defenses. Nevertheless, some
members of the Court found outlets to express their due process views.
Most notably, in Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott, the defendant sought a
stay on a judgment pending disposition of its petition for certiorari.158
The case involved a state law class action of fraud claims against
cigarette manufacturers, and the defendant sought review of a class
action order that, among other things, did not require the class
members to prove reliance on the fraud.159 Accordingly, "the court
eliminated any need for respondents to prove, and denied any
opportunity for applicants to contest, that any particular plaintiff who
benefits from the judgment" relied upon the alleged fraud. 160
Because the case was not a federal class action, it did not implicate
Rule 23, and thus, in addressing the petition for a stay, Justice Scalia was
free to opine on the due process issues directly. In granting the stay, and
only writing for himself, Justice Scalia pithily summarized the
exceptional view of the class action, stating that a stay was warranted
because the case "implicates constitutional constraints on the allowable
alteration of normal process in class actions."161 Justice Scalia, in
particular, registered his disgust with the lower court's proceedings
because "individual plaintiffs who could not recover had they sued
separately can recover only because their claims were aggregated with
others' through the procedural device of the class action."162 A better
statement of the exceptional view of the class action could not have been
made, and it is no surprise that these words come from Justice Scalia,
who authored the Wal-Mart, AT&T, and Comcast decisions. Despite the
157 McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 232 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Newton v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2001)). This concern
is discussed in more detail in the following Section. See infra Section I.D.1.
158 561 U.S. 1301 (Scalia, Circuit Justice 2010).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 1303.
161 Id. at 1302-03 (emphasis added).
162 Id. at 1303.
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granting of the stay, the Court did not grant certiorari in the case.
163
Nevertheless, in his grant of the stay, Justice Scalia demarcated a line in
the sand on how he viewed the class action.
4. An Existential Threat to the Class Action
Indeed, when viewed as a whole, Wal-Mart, AT&T, and Comcast
demonstrate that the "exceptional" view of the class action poses an
existential threat to the class action itself. If the claim or defense is truly
an entitlement (indeed, one's "property")164 then, under the Due Process
Clause, it cannot be deprived without due process of law.
Arguably there is no deprivation when the class action procedure
mirrors the outcome of an individualized procedure, and thus a class
action does not run afoul of due process if it does not materially differ
from a separate action. However, to the extent there is a deprivation,
something is needed to justify it.
Very subtly, the Court in the Wal-Mart and Comcast line of cases
ignored, or forgot, the purposes for using the class action so that a
justification cannot emerge. Admittedly, the Court in Wal-Mart
mentioned that the class action provides an "economical" method of
resolving common issues.165 But, just a month before deciding Wal-
Mart, the Court in AT&T suggested that class procedures actually
complicate matters, leading to a "procedural morass." 166 Indeed, in all of
its class action decisions decided after 2009, the Court has mentioned
the "policy at the very core"167 of the class action-increasing the
leverage of plaintiffs to litigate small claims-in only two cases. 168 By not
163 Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Jackson, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011) (mem.).
164 See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982) (holding that "a cause of
action is a species of property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause")
(citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)).
165 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349 n.5 (2011).
166 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepci6n, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011).
167 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
168 Cal. Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2054 (2017) (Kennedy, J.)
("The very premise of class actions is that 'small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights."') (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at
617); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 478 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.)
(same) (citing Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617). Justice Ginsburg also cited this "core policy" in
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articulating any benefit of the class action, the Court has cast the class
action as an exception with no justification.
D. Procedure and Substance
The exceptional view of the class action can be understood as
simply a view about the class action. However, in a number of different
contexts, the Court has used the exceptional view of the class action, and
the day in court ideal on which it is based, to influence its interpretation
of areas of law outside of the class action context. Indeed, the Court has
used the day in court ideal to influence the scope of substantive law
itself. In other words, the exceptional view is part of a larger view in
which function follows ideal form.
1. Rules Enabling Act
In rejecting the "Trial by Formula" proposed by the plaintiffs in
Wal-Mart, the Court noted that the procedure would not allow Wal-
Mart "to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims."l69
Curiously, however, the Court did not identify this as a due process
concern, but a concern with the Rules Enabling Act.170 Specifically, the
Wal-Mart Court wrote that the class action cannot prevent Wal-Mart
from litigating its defenses against individual class members "[b]ecause
the Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule 23 to 'abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right."'171 In support of its conclusion, the
Court cited Ortiz, which made a similar point about the mandatory
nature of the proposed Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class action of asbestos
claims.172 There, in invoking the Rule Enabling Act, the Ortiz Court
dissent in Stolt-Nielsen. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 699
(2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("When adjudication is costly and individual claims are no
more than modest in size, class proceedings may be 'the thing,' i.e., without them, potential
claimants will have little, if any, incentive to seek vindication of their rights.") (citing Amchem,
521 U.S. at 617).
169 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 367.
170 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018).




emphasized "the tension between the limited fund class action's pro rata
distribution in equity and the rights of individual tort victims at law."l73
By invoking the Rules Enabling Act, the Court in both Wal-Mart
and Ortiz did not appeal to an independent requirement of due process.
Instead, in both instances the Court looked to the substantive law itself
to support its insistence on party control over claims and defenses. In
essence, the Court concluded in both cases that the claims and defenses
created by the substantive law are "preexisting right[s],"174 which the
Rules cannot "abridge, enlarge, or modify."175 As it so happens, the
existence of state tort law monetary remedies (as in Ortiz) and
affirmative defenses under Title VII (as in Wal-Mart) also comport with
the exceptional view of the class action. Both imply a preference by the
substantive law for tailored hearings on individual issues such as
damages or defenses.
The Court outlined a much stronger version of the exceptional
view of the class action in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v.
Allstate Insurance Co., which it decided the year before Wal-Mart and
foreshadowed the Court's goal in bringing class action law closer to the
exceptional view. 176 There, the Court addressed whether the Rules
Enabling Act prohibits the use of Rule 23 for state law claims when there
exists a state law prohibition on class actions for the same claims.177
In Shady Grove, Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, concluded
that Rule 23 does not violate the Rules Enabling Act given such
circumstances because, following prior precedent, the Rule "really
regulates procedure," and is thus valid regardless of its impact on
substantive rights.178 But in making this conclusion, Justice Scalia
conceptualized Rule 23 as simply a "joinder" device that combined
173 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999).
174 RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 84 (2007) (arguing
against the use of mandatory class actions in mass tort litigation since "the delegation made in
the [Rules Enabling] Act must stop short of the legislative power that Congress might wield to
alter preexisting rights.").
175 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018).
176 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010).
177 See id.
178 Id. at 410 (plurality opinion) ("We have held... and reaffirmed repeatedly, that the
validity of a Federal Rule depends entirely upon whether it regulates procedure."); Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (concluding that a rule does not violate the Rules Enabling
Act if it "really regulates procedure").
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individual claims, and, furthermore, stated that Rule 23 is valid under
the Rules Enabling Act "at least insofar as [the Rule] allows willing
plaintiffs to join their separate claims against the same defendants in a
class action."179 Here, Justice Scalia suggests that a mandatory class
action of unwilling plaintiffs may be considered an "abridge[ment],
enlarge[ment], or modif[ication of] any substantive right."180
In both Ortiz and in Wal-Mart, the Court identified specific
features of the law that might be "abridge[d]" by the class action. In
contrast, Justice Scalia's general statement in Shady Grove that Rule 23 is
valid so long as it is nonmandatory, suggests a much stronger
conception of the day in court ideal. In essence, Justice Scalia's aside
strongly suggests that the exceptional view is not an implication of some
or most substantive laws, but that all substantive laws import the day in
court ideal.
2. Arbitration
The Court has also expressed a stronger conception of the
exceptional view of the class action in its arbitration cases, where the
Court addressed whether an arbitration agreement can permit (or
prohibit) class action procedures.
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., decided
the same year as Shady Grove, the Court addressed whether an
arbitrator can interpret a contract to include a class action-like
procedure despite the contract's silence on the issue.181 Justice Alito,
writing for a majority, concluded that an arbitrator interpreting an
arbitration clause as implicitly allowing class actions violates the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).182 The majority did so despite the fact that an
arbitrator's interpretive decision can only be vacated under the FAA if
"[an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the
179 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 408 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added); see also Adam N.
Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism Erie and the Rules Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86
NOTREDAMEL. REv. 1131, 1164 (2011) (highlighting Justice Scalia's caveat).
180 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018).
181 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
182 Id. at 685 ("An implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration ... is not a term
that the arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of the parties' agreement to arbitrate.").
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agreement and effectively 'dispense[s] his own brand of industrial
justice."'183
In the majority's view, the arbitrator "impose[d] its own policy
preference" because "class action arbitration changes the nature of
arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties
consented to it."184 Class action arbitration does so in three ways: (1)
rather than decide a single dispute, the arbitrator "instead resolves many
disputes between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of parties,"
which would undermine the confidentiality of the proceedings; (2)
"[lthe arbitrator's award no longer purports to bind just the parties to a
single arbitration agreement, but adjudicates the rights of absent parties
as well;" and (3) "the commercial stakes of class-action arbitration are
comparable to those of class-action litigation."185
In essence, the Stolt-Nielsen Court concluded that parties to an
arbitration clause implicitly consented to the day in court ideal, such
that one cannot presume a deviation from that ideal. Indeed, in support
of its conclusion that the arbitrator lacks authority to interpret a silent
contract to implicitly permit class arbitration, the Court quoted Ortiz's
statement hat "'the burden of justification rests on the exception' to the
general rule that 'one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a
litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not
been made a party by service of process."'186 Thus, the day in court ideal
is unavoidable, even in a contract designed to avoid the normal
procedures of civil litigation.
The Court reached a similar result in two later arbitration cases
involving provisions barring class action procedures. In AT&T, the
Court addressed whether the FAA allows for California state law to hold
as unconscionable a provision in an arbitration agreement that class
procedures (both in arbitration and in civil litigation) cannot be used.187
The Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice Scalia, concluded
that such a state law is pre-empted by the FAA because a state law
183 Id. at 671 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
184 Id. at 675, 685.
185 Id. at 686.
186 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999)).
187 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepci6n, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011).
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invalidating a class action waiver would frustrate the purposes of the
FAA. 188
Citing Stolt-Nielsen, the Court first noted that class action
procedures frustrate many of the advantages of arbitration "as a
structural matter: [c]lasswide arbitration includes absent parties,
necessitating additional and different procedures, and involving higher
stakes."189 As a result, class arbitration "makes the process slower, more
costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final
judgment."90 It also increases procedural formality, and "greatly
increases risks to defendants."191 in other words, for the AT&T Court, a
state law imposing the availability of class action procedures in
arbitration would frustrate arbitration itself. Whereas the Court in Stolt-
Nielsen embedded the day in court ideal in the parties' agreement, the
Court in AT&T embedded the day in court ideal into the very definition
of "arbitration" under the FAA.
Shortly after deciding AT&T, the Court decided American Express-
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, which concerned whether a federal law
could invalidate a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement.192
Specifically, the Court addressed whether a class action waiver would
frustrate the enforcement of federal antitrust law, particularly for claims
that are too small and costly to litigate.193 The Court, unsurprisingly,
concluded that federal antitrust law did not carry that implication.
In particular, the Italian Colors Court noted that there is no federaL
statutory law explicitly requiring the class action treatment of federal
antitrust claims, concluding that "the antitrust laws do not guarantee an
affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim."194
Moreover, the Court concluded that Rule 23 does not provide such an
entitlement because "such an entitlement, invalidating private
arbitration agreements denying class adjudication, would" violate the
Rules Enabling Act. 195 After pointing "to the usual rule that litigation is
188 See id. at 346-47.
189 Id. at 347-48 (citing Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 686).
190 AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 348.
191 Id. at 350.
192 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231 (2013).
193 Id. at 231-32.
194 Id. at 233.
195 Id. at 234 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018)).
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conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only," the
Court concluded that antitrust policy cannot frustrate an "agree[ment]
to arbitrate pursuant to that 'usual rule,' and it would be remarkable for
a court to erase that expectation."196 The day in court ideal struck again.
The Italian Colors Court further rejected the application of the
judge-made rule that an arbitration agreement will not be enforced if it
prevents "the 'effective vindication' of a federal statutory right."l97 In
essence, the Italian Colors Court concluded that "[t]ruth to tell, our
decision in AT&T Mobility all but resolves this case." 198 In particular, in
embedding the day in court ideal into the very definition of arbitration
under the FAA, the AT&T Court "specifically rejected the argument
that class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims 'that might
otherwise slip through the legal system."'199 Thus, in Italian Colors, the
Court not only further embedded the day in court ideal into the very
definition of arbitration, but it also put into doubt the one justification
for class actions that the Amchem Court considered the class action's
"policy at the very core"-the vindication of small claims that would not
otherwise be brought.200
3. Article III
As shown above, the Court's view of the day in court ideal, which
has informed its exceptional view of the class action, has also informed
its procedural law in the Rules Enabling Act and arbitration contexts.
The same is true of Article III. For example, is a class action moot under
Article III if, prior to certification of the class, the representative party's
claim is moot? Under the exceptional view, and as indicated by Smith v.
Bayer, an uncertified class action is not a class action at all, but just an
individual action that has no preclusive effects on nonparties.
201 It
196 Id.
197 Id. at 235.
198 Id. at 238.
199 Id. (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepci6n, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011)).
200 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
201 Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 315 (2011) ("Neither a proposed class action nor a
rejected class action may bind nonparties.").
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follows that if the class representative of an uncertified class action has a
moot claim, then there is no other party interest that keeps the class
action alive.
The Court was presented with this issue in Genesis Healthcare
Corp. v. Symczyk, which concerned whether a "collective action" under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was moot because the
representative plaintiff received, but rejected, a settlement offer that
would have satisfied her entire claim.202 There, the plaintiff had
conceded that her claim was moot, and no other plaintiff opted into the
action, as required under the FLSA.203 Accordingly, the Court concluded
that the action was moot because the plaintiffs mooted claim was the
only one before the Court.204
In affirming the case as moot, the majority in Symczyk
distinguished the case from class actions certified under Rule 23.205 The
Court noted that in FLSA collective actions, the employees only
"become parties ... by filing written consent with the court."206 In,
contrast, upon certification of a Rule 23 class action, "the class of
unnamed persons described in the certification acquire[s] a legal status
separate from the interest asserted by [the named plaintiff]."207
Nevertheless, the Court did suggest that a similar Rule 23 class action
would also be moot. In particular, the Court noted in a footnote recent
precedent holding that "[an] interest in attorney's fees is ... insufficient
to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the
merits of the underlying claim."208
This suggestion in Symczyk flies in the face of older precedent,
which held that a party can appeal the denial of class certification,
despite having a moot claim, "so long as [the class representative]
202 Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 69 (2013).
203 Id. at 72-73; see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2018) (permitting "collective actions" in which
the plaintiff asserts the claims of herself and all "other employees similarly situated," but further
providing that "[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his
consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such
action is brought.").
204 Symczyk, 569 U.S. at 72-73.
205 Id. at 74-75.
206 Id. at 75.
207 Id. at 74 (alteration in original) (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399-402 (1975)).
208 Id. at 78 n.5 (quoting Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990)).
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retained an economic interest in class certification."209 While
inconsistent with prior precedent, the Court's suggestion in Symczyk is
perfectly consistent with the day in court ideal. When there is no class
action, there is no class action, and, in such situations, the "usual rule"
applies.210
4. Substantive Law
As shown above, the Court has used the day in court ideal and its
corollary, the exceptional view of the class action, to guide its
interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act, the FAA, and Article III.
However, all three areas are largely, if not completely, procedural, and
thus it is perhaps not surprising that the Court would allow the day in
court ideal to influence its views in those areas. The Court, however, has
also used the day in court ideal to influence its interpretation of
substantive law. Specifically, the Court has used the ideal to define, and
in some cases limit, the rights protected under substantive law.
This can be seen in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, where the Court
very subtly transforms Title VII law to fit within the confines of the day
in court ideal. In Wal-Mart, the plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart's hiring
and promotion practices contained excessive subjectivity, which, they
alleged, resulted in Wal-Mart discriminating against women in violation
of Title VII.211 The plaintiffs alleged a Title VII "disparate treatment
pattern-or-practice" claim, which requires a showing of discriminatory
intent, rather than a "disparate impact" claim, which would only allege
that Wal-Mart's otherwise nondiscriminatory conduct had the effect of
discriminating against women.
212
The plaintiffs' claim, in essence, was: (1) that Wal-Mart gave its
store managers excessive discretion to make pay raise and promotion
decisions; (2) that this discretion resulted in the differential treatment of
209 Deposit Guar. Nat'1 Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332-33 (1980).
210 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 234 (2013) (Rule 23 was "designed
to allow an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the
individual named parties only.") (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)).
211 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 344-45 (2011).
212 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334, 336 n.16 (1977); see also
Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 345-46.
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women; (3) that Wal-Mart knew about it; and (4) that Wal-Mart
"refus[ed] to cabin its managers' authority."213 In other words, the
plaintiffs sought to establish a discriminatory "pattern or practice" based
upon the absence of any formal criteria for pay and promotion
decisions, combined with other centralized policies and "a strong and
uniform 'corporate culture."'214
Lower courts have previously accepted this excessive discretion
theory of disparate treatment and have considered it a common policy
for purposes of class certification.215 Such courts have concluded that,
just like an explicitly sexist pay and promotion policy, a policy that
lacked any guidelines could knowingly result in women being
discriminated against in violation of Title VII. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that "[s]ignificant proof that an employer
operated under a general policy of discrimination conceivably could
justify a class . .. if the discrimination manifested itself.. . in the same
general fashion, such as through entirely subjective decisionmaking
processes."216
A common discriminatory policy based on excessive discretion,
however, can be difficult to see, particularly in the context of an
individual case. After all, "excessive discretion" is simply another way of
saying that there is the absence of a common policy. This point was
made forcefully by Justice Kennedy during oral argument:
It's-it's hard for me to see that the-your complaint faces in two
directions. Number one, you said this is a culture where Arkansas
knows, the headquarters knows, everything that's going on. Then in
the next breath, you say, well, now these supervisors have too much
213 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 344-45.
214 Id.
215 See, e.g., Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Allegations of
similar discriminatory employment practices, such as the use of entirely subjective personnel
processes that operate to discriminate, satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements of
Rule 23(a)."); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 292 (2d Cir. 1999),
overruled on other grounds by In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006).
216 Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982).
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discretion. It seems to me there's an inconsistency there, and I'm just
not sure what the unlawful policy is.
21 7
Similarly, during oral argument, Justice Scalia remarked that:
I don't-I'm getting whipsawed here. On the one hand, you say the
problem is that they were utterly subjective, and on the other hand
you say there is a-a strong corporate culture that guides all of this.
Well, which is it? It's either the individual supervisors are left on
their own, or else there is a strong corporate culture that tells them
what to do.218
According to both Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia, excessive
discretion is the antithesis of a common policy. Either Wal-Mart
directed the pay and promotion decisions or, by granting discretion to
lower-level managers, it did not.
This confusion arises from the fact that both justices were seeking
to put the plaintiffs' "excessive discretion" claim into the box of the day
in court ideal. Under the day in court ideal, an individual adjudication
looks at how the conduct of the defendant injured the plaintiff. But both
justices were struggling to find out what that conduct actually was. If it
was the independent conduct of the store managers, then it was the
managers who did the discrimination in the absence of evidence that
this discretion was somehow controlled by the employer. Indeed, how
could Wal-Mart assert an individual defense if the only thing being
challenged is a local store manager's decision that was, as a matter of
policy, not directed by Wal-Mart at all?
The Wal-Mart plaintiffs sought to show a nexus between the
individual decisions of the store managers and Wal-Mart by presenting
evidence that, among other things, Wal-Mart's "strongly imbued
culture" was used "to guide managers in the exercise of their
discretion."219 This may have been a smart move on the part of the
plaintiffs' attorneys to sway the Court, but it was by no means a
necessary move. Lower courts have found such a nexus simply from the
217 Tr. Oral Argument at 27-28, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), https://
www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/2010/10-277.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2A4Q-DN7W].
218 Id. at 29.
219 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 153 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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existence of discretion at all levels, concluding that a "subjective,
decentralized system of decisionmaking" can be common to a class if
such decision-making is "uniform throughout the country and [is]
promulgated by the national corporate office."220
An employer can discriminate from excessive discretion alone if
one looks beyond the day in court ideal, to how such discretion affects
not just the parties in an individual case, but others outside the case. As
put by Justice Breyer during oral argument,
Is the-is the common question of law or fact whether, given the
training which central management knew ... given the facts about
what people say and how they behave, many of which central
management knew, and given the results which central management
knew or should have known, should central management under the
law have withdrawn some of the subjective discretion in order to stop
these results?221
Put another way, Wal-Mart may not have caused the decisions made by
its storemanagers, either in a formal or informal, "cultural" sense. But
Wal-Mart may have known what the aggregate result would have been
and may have intended to produce that result. Here the only causal
nexus Wal-Mart would need to effectuate discrimination is to simply
deploy the excessive discretion.
In its decision, however, the Wal-Mart Court set aside what may be
called this third, "deliberate indifference" possibility because this
possibility is difficult to fit within the day in court ideal. Such a
possibility would require a statistical analysis of the cases as a whole to
get a sense of whether an employer tried to discriminate by, in effect,
looking the other way. Although such evidence could be presented in
the context of an individual case, it would, of necessity, require the
Court to look beyond the case and embed aggregate, statistical proof
within the context of an individualized adjudication. 222 This is the very
220 See, e.g., Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 169 F.R.D. 349, 356 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(noting that "UPS personnel policies are uniform throughout the country and are promulgated
by the national corporate office. These policies include the subjective, decentralized system of
decision-making which the plaintiffs allege is discriminatory.").
221 Tr. Oral Argument, supra note 217, at 36.
222 See Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
1105, 1109-10 (2010) (defining "embedded aggregation" as when "[a]n aggregate dimension, in
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statistical proof that the Court would castigate as a "Trial by Formula"
later in the opinion.223
Indeed, the Court made clear its distaste for such aggregate proof
by rejecting the "nexus" evidence presented by the plaintiffs in support
of commonality. Among other things,224 the Court rejected the
statistical evidence presented of gender bias because, even if it showed
bias, "almost all of [the store managers] will claim to have been applying
some sex-neutral, performance-based criteria-whose nature and effects
will differ from store to store."225 But the fact that the store managers
may provide different, innocent explanations in an individual case does
not disprove Wal-Mart's alleged common discriminatory conduct. Wal-
Mart, in fact, may have been counting on the aggregate effect of such
imperfect, innocent discretionary decision-making to effectuate its
discrimination. But considering that possibility would require the Court
to not view each case in isolation, but as part of a whole, and the day in
court ideal does not permit the Court to do that.
The Court ensures its preservation of the day in court ideal by
insisting that the "commonality" requirement of Rule 23 requires not
only a showing of common questions, but also that the plaintiffs' claims
can be resolved with "common answers."226 As noted earlier, this move,
in part, was designed to adopt the "resolvability" interpretation of the
"predominance" requirement percolating through the lower courts
during this time.227 But it also had the effect of requiring a party seeking
class certification of a Title VII claim to assert the "same injury" rather
than the same violation, or, more precisely, that the parties were
discriminated by an express policy that one could point to in each and
every individual case.2 28 As put by the Court, "[o]ther than the bare
existence of delegated discretion, respondents have identified no
short, is 'embedded' doctrinally within what appears to be an individual lawsuit. That aggregate
dimension, in turn, gives rise to demands for binding effect of a commensurately aggregate
scope.").
223 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 367.
224 The Court also rejected, in an almost summary fashion, the anecdotal evidence and
corporate culture expert testimony presented by the plaintiffs. Id. at 354-59.
225 Id. at 357.
226 Id. at 349-50 (quoting Nagareda, supra note 10, at 131-32).
227 See supra Section I.B.1.
228 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 348-50; see also Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The
Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 39-40 (2011).
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'specific employment practice'-much less one that ties all their 1.5
million claims together. Merely showing that Wal-Mart's policy of
discretion has produced an overall sex-based disparity does not
suffice,"229 even if Wal-Mart intended to produce that very result.
Although this ruling in Wal-Mart is couched in terms of Rule 23's
commonality" requirement, it can also be read as a restriction in the
kinds of disparate treatment claims one can assert under Title VII, both
as a formal matter and a practical matter.230 More importantly, this
restriction can only be understood as a way to reconcile "excessive
discretion" claims with the day in court ideal, and thus demonstrates
that, for the Court, function does indeed follow form.
II. AN ALTERNATIVE AWAKENS
The Court's decisions in Wal-Mart, Comcast, and Italian Colors
signaled that it was willing to move the law of class actions closer to the
exceptional view and even imperil the class action altogether.
Accordingly, when, in the October 2015 term, the Court granted
certiorari to three class action cases, there was a general consensus that
the cases would provide opportunities for the Court to close the gap
even further.231
229 Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 357.
230 See Stephanie S. Silk, Note, More Decentralization, Less Liability: The Future of Systemic
Disparate Treatment Claims in the Wake of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 637, 654
(2013) ("Given the nature of modern discrimination, the Court's rejection of the Dukes
plaintiffs' evidence will not only have far-reaching consequences for plaintiffs seeking class
certification, but also for individual plaintiffs seeking redress for employment discrimination
under a theory of disparate treatment. Interestingly, many scholars discussing the Dukes
decision have focused on its impact on Title VII liability rather than on the issue of class
certification."); see also Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law:
Changed Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 937, 990-92 (2014)
(discussing impact of Wal-Mart on systemic disparate treatment claims, noting that "[i]t may
be the case that the Supreme Court is incapable of seeing discrimination other than in its most
blatant forms").
231 See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Class Actions Face Crucible in Next Supreme Court Term,
REUTERS (June 9, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/06/09/class-actions-face-
crucible-in-next-supreme-court-term [https://perma.cc/P9KD-4C2J] ("By this time next year,
class action lawyers could be looking back with nostalgia and regret at the good old days when
they only had to worry about Wal-Mart v. Dukes and Comcast v. Behrend.").
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But no one foresaw the death of Justice Scalia232 and what a
profound impact his death would have on the Court's class action
jurisprudence. In hindsight, that impact was obvious-Justice Scalia,
after all, authored the majority opinions in Wal-Mart, Comcast, and
Italian Colors. But the impact was nevertheless significant. Although the
seeds of a different view emerged slightly before his death in his very last
class action case, Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez,
2 33 they only fully
bloomed in the two decisions issued immediately after his passing-
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo234 and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.235 Indeed,
it is in Tyson where the Court very subtly, but unmistakably, departs
from the exceptional view, and thus casts a new light on both Campbell-
Ewald and Spokeo.
A. The Predominance Requirement
As noted earlier, prior to the October 2015 Term, the Court
interpreted the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions to require class actions that can be accurately resolved in a
collective manner.236 This "resolvability" interpretation of the
predominance requirement was designed to protect the integrity of the
day in court ideal at the heart of the Court's exceptional view of the class
action. Insofar as parties are entitled to an individualized "day in court"
to assert their claims and defenses, a class action cannot take away that
entitlement absent great justification.237 Consequently, in the absence of
such a justification, the class action is tolerated to the extent that it
"resolves" cases in exactly the same way as they would be resolved
through individualized, separate actions.
232 Liptak, supra note 3.
233 Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016).
234 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).
235 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
236 See supra Section I.B.
237 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010) ("'[T]he burden of
justification rests on the exception' to the general rule that 'one is not bound by a judgment in
personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been




Accordingly, as emphasized in Wal-Mart, efforts to use statistical
evidence of nonparties to conclusively determine damages in individual
cases were disfavored as a "Trial by Formula" that failed to provide
"further individualized proceedings."238 More importantly, in Comcast,
the Court suggested, without holding so, that a party seeking to certify a
class action cannot satisfy the predominance requirement if the party
cannot propose a common method of accurately determining each
plaintiffs damages.239
In granting certiorari in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, the Court
was presented with an opportunity to solidify Comcast's dicta into law.
The Court granted certiorari on two questions, the first directly
implicating both Wal-Mart and Comcast:
Whether differences among individual class members may be
ignored and a class action certified under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3), or a collective action certified under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, where liability and damages will be determined
with statistical techniques that presume all class members are
identical to the average observed in a sample [.240
In Tyson, the plaintiffs, all meat processing workers at a Tyson Foods
plant in Iowa, sought to certify a class action seeking overtime pay owed
to them for the time spent "donning and doffing" protective gear.241
Although both the FLSA and Iowa state law entitled the workers to
overtime for time worked in excess of forty hours a week, Tyson failed
to keep records of their donning and doffing times.242 Thus, to prove
both the amount of time spent "donning and doffing" as well as any
overtime pay that would result, the plaintiffs relied upon Anderson v.
Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., a 1946 case in which the Supreme Court
238 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011).
239 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34-36 (2013).
240 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146, 2015
WL 1285369 (Mar. 19, 2015).
241 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1041-42 (2016). The plaintiffs sought
to certify both a "collective action" for their claims under the federal FLSA and a separate Rule
23 class action for similar claims under Iowa state law. Id. at 1042.
242 Id. ("At no point did Tyson record the time each employee spent donning and doffing.").
2019] 2271
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
permitted parties to use "representative evidence" to prove overtime in
the absence of time records.243
As indicated by the question presented, Tyson concerned whether
the plaintiffs could use "representative evidence" to prove damages in a
class action, and thus implicated Wal-Mart. Like the proposed "Trial by
Formula" in Wal-Mart, the "representative evidence" used by the
plaintiffs was based on an expert sampling of the donning and doffing
times of representative workers to determine an average time that would
apply to all members of the class.244 The plaintiffs then employed a
different expert to use this average to determine what percentage of the
class qualified for overtime.245
The case also implicated Comcast. By definition, the representative
evidence could not determine with perfect accuracy the amount of time
spent donning and doffing by each individual class worker. It was at best
an approximation that was in conflict with the dicta in Comcast
mandating a common method for accurately determining damages.
Accordingly, the Court in Tyson had an opportunity to decide
conclusively that a class action cannot satisfy the predominance
requirement if it uses averaging methods to determine individual issues,
a result strongly implied by both Wal-Mart and Comcast.
The Court, however, declined to take that opportunity. As put by
Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion, "[o]ne way for
respondents to show .. . that the sample relied upon here is a
permissible method of proving classwide liability is by showing that
each class member could have relied on that sample to establish liability
if he or she had brought an individual action."246 Accordingly, because
the Court in Mt. Clemens permitted representative evidence in
individual actions, the Court concluded that such evidence was equally
permissible in a class action.247
243 Id. at 1046-47; see Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686-88 (1946).
244 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1043 (noting that the expert "conducted 744 videotaped observations
and analyzed how long various donning and doffing activities took. He then averaged the time
taken in the observations to produce an estimate of 18 minutes a day for the cut and retrim
departments and 21.25 minutes for the kill department.").
245 Id. at 1043-44.
246 Id. at 1046.
247 Id. at 1047.
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At first glance, the Court's conclusion about the permissibility of
representative evidence is consistent with the exceptional view of the
class action. Again, under the exceptional view, a class action is tolerated
only insofar as it does not deviate from what would occur in an
individual action. Accordingly, a class action that employed
representative evidence for such FLSA claims is permissible because the
class action would not deviate from an individual action where the same
evidence was permissible. This may explain why Chief Justice Roberts
ultimately agreed with the majority's conclusion that the representative
evidence was permissible because it satisfied "the same standard of
proof that would apply in any case."248
Understood in this way, Tyson does not depart from the
exceptional view, but is simply an extension of it. As the Court noted
when distinguishing Tyson from Wal-Mart,
While the experiences of the employees in Wal-Mart bore little
relationship to one another, in this case each employee worked in the
same facility, did similar work, and was paid under the same policy.
As Mt. Clemens confirms, under these circumstances the experiences
of a subset of employees can be probative as to the experiences of all
of them.249
Although the Court tries to distinguish the two cases based on the
dissimilarity among claims in Wal-Mart, the real distinction is that the
workers in Tyson could rely upon Mt. Clemens while no apparent
equivalent existed for the workers' Title VII claims in Wal-Mart.
B. Entitlement o a "Day in Court"
Although the Tyson decision on representative evidence appears to
be consistent with the exceptional view of the class action, other aspects
of the decision reveal its true nature as a departure from that view. As
noted earlier, the exceptional view considers individualized adjudication
an entitlement that cannot be taken away through the use of the class
action absent great justification. In Wal-Mart, for example, the Court
rejected the proposed "Trial by Formula" because it did not permit Wal-
248 Id. at 1051 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
249 Id. at 1048 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
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Mart to assert individualized defenses, and "a class cannot be certified
on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory
defenses to individual claims."250
Similarly, implicit in the Comcast Court's insistence that the
predominance requirement requires a common method of accurately
determining damages is that procedures like bifurcation, which would
allow individual adjudication only as to damages, are insufficient. If a
party is entitled to full, individualized adjudication, then it is entitled to
all of it, not some of it. Indeed, the dissent in Comcast was spurred, in
part, to emphasize that this aspect of the Comcast decision was dicta,
and thus did not prohibit the use of bifurcation in other cases.
251
This entitlement aspect of the exceptional view, and the day in
court ideal upon which it is based, largely explains Tyson's litigation
strategy. After certification of the class action in Tyson, the case
proceeded to trial, but Tyson continued to insist that class certification
was inappropriate. For that reason, Tyson did not challenge the
admissibility of the plaintiffs' representative evidence of donning and
doffing because, in Tyson's view, "the varying amounts of time it took
employees to don and doff different protective equipment made the
lawsuit too speculative for classwide recovery."252 Indeed, Rule 23
permits a court to revisit certification of a class action if turns out that
certification was unwarranted, a point Tyson emphasized throughout
the litigation.253
In addition, at some point during the proceedings, the plaintiffs in
Tyson proposed a bifurcation procedure so that individual damage
issues could be determined on an individual basis. Tyson, however,
rejected the bifurcation proposal, and chose not to propose an
alternative bifurcation procedure.254 Although the reasons for that
rejection are murky from the record, at bottom the rejection stems from
Tyson insistence that no class procedure should be used, and existing
250 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (emphasis added).
251 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 41-42 (2013) (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing sources and concluding that "[r]ecognition that individual damages
calculations do not preclude class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is well nigh universal.")
252 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1044.
253 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C) ("An order that grants or denies class certification may be
altered or amended before final judgment.").
254 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1044.
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case law up to that point certainly supported that claim of entitlement.
Indeed, the Court's insistence in Comcast on an accurate common
method of determining individual damages put into doubt whether
bifurcation could be permissibly used at all in a class action.255
If, under the exceptional view, a party is entitled to a "day in court,"
then it follows that Tyson had no obligation to accept anything less than
its full entitlement. But in Tyson the Court implied that Tyson may have
had some duty to accept a half-loaf. For example, while the Court noted
that the representative evidence may be flawed, "Petitioner, however,
did not raise a challenge to respondents' experts' methodology under
Daubert; and, as a result, there is no basis in the record to conclude it
was legal error to admit that evidence."256 This is in direct conflict with
Comcast. As Justice Thomas pointed out in dissent, Comcast held that a
failure to challenge the admissibility of evidence "does not preclude
defendants from 'argu[ing] that the evidence failed to show that the case
is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis.'"257
The Court also suggested, without deciding, that Tyson may have
had an obligation to consider the bifurcation proposal. In a variation of
the second question presented, Tyson contended that the class
contained uninjured parties, and thus a class action was not appropriate
unless the plaintiffs could provide "some mechanism to identify the
uninjured class members prior to judgment."258 This was a potential
problem in the case, as the jury returned a puzzling result. Although the
jury accepted the average donning and doffing times determined by the
plaintiffs' first expert, it did not fully accept the percentage of overtime
255 4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 60, § 11:7 (noting that after the Court's
decisions in Wal-Mart and Comcast, "courts have struggled with the extent to which the
decisions affect the continued viability of bifurcated liability/damage class action trials").
256 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1049.
257 Id. at 1060 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Comcast v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 n.4
(2013)).
258 Id. at 1049. The original second question presented concerned whether a class action
could be certified if the class contains uninjured parties, raising Article III standing concerns.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016) (No.
14-1146), 2015 WL 1285369 (Mar. 19, 2015). However, Tyson conceded that "[t]he fact that
federal courts lack authority to compensate persons who cannot prove injury does not mean
that a class action (or collective action) can never be certified in the absence of proof that all
class members were injured." Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1049 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 49, Tyson,
136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016)).
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pay determined by the plaintiffs' second expert.
259 This resulted in an
aggregate award that was half of what was proposed.260 Tyson argued,
correctly, that it was far from clear how the award was going to be
distributed so that uninjured parties do not, in fact, recover, a point that
was echoed by Justice Roberts in concurrence.
261
The Court concluded that because the jury award had not yet been
disbursed, "[w]hether that or some other methodology will be successful
in identifying uninjured class members is a question that, on this record,
is premature."262 But the Court went further and suggested, without
deciding, that "this problem appears to be one of petitioner's own
making" because Tyson rejected the plaintiffs' proposed bifurcation
procedure.263 The Court thus remanded the case to the district court,
instructing the court to determine "[w]hether, in light of the foregoing,
any error should be deemed invited."264
In suggesting that Tyson may have "invited" its own problems, the
Tyson Court sharply departs from the exceptional view. This is because
the entitlement to individualized procedures that sunk the "Trial by
Formula" procedure in Wal-Mart simply evaporates in Tyson. Indeed,
the Court in Tyson suggests that insisting on one's entitlement to a day
in court could actually be detrimental to one's case, as inviting error
rather than preventing the error of the class action itself.
C. Substance and Procedure
Tyson's departure from the exceptional view is fully revealed when
one considers a short, but profound aside made in the case. In stating
that "representative evidence" was permissible in a class action, the
Tyson Court further observed that prohibiting such representative
evidence in a class action "would ignore the Rules Enabling Act's
pellucid instruction that use of the class device cannot 'abridge ... any
259 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1044.
260 Id. ("The jury more than halved the damages recommended by [the second expert].").
261 Id. at 1053 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("Given this difficulty [in identifying noninjured
class members], it remains to be seen whether the jury verdict can stand.").





substantive right."'265 It later reiterated that prohibiting representative
evidence in a class action "would have violated the Rules Enabling Act
by giving plaintiffs and defendants different rights in a class proceeding
than they could have asserted in an individual action."266 Although the
Court did not elaborate further on this observation, it nevertheless
reveals Tyson to be a true departure from the exceptional view, and
situates the Court's other two class action cases decided during the
October 2015 term, Campbell-Ewald and Spokeo, within that departure.
In the October 2009 term, the year the Court began to refashion
the law of class actions, Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, concluded
in Shady Grove that a Rule 23 class action was permissible under the
Rules Enabling Act so long as the plaintiffs were "willing."267 There,
Justice Scalia strongly implied that the day in court ideal not only
entitles a party to an individualized proceeding, but that a Rule 23 class
action that takes away such a proceeding from an unwilling party would
"abridge, enlarge, or modify [a] substantive right" in violation of the
Rules Enabling Act.268 Accordingly, at the heart of Justice Scalia's view
in Shady Grove, and the exceptional view of the class action in general, is
that the day in court ideal is more than a preference, it is a "substantive
right" that the class action has the potential to put in danger.
Given this aspect of Shady Grove, the Rules Enabling Act
observation in Tyson is odd. The Tyson Court presumes that if
representative evidence is permitted in an individual action, then it
should be permitted in a class action. But if a "day in court" is the
relevant "substantive right" for Rules Enabling Act (indeed, the very
core of the day in court ideal), then the Court would at least have
questioned the propriety of representative evidence even in individual
cases. After all, the use of representative evidence, at least as used in
Tyson, necessarily involved the use of evidence from one case to
265 Id. at 1046.
266 Id. at 1048.
267 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010)
(plurality opinion).




determine the outcome in a completely different case, a method that
repulsed the Court in Wal-Mart.269
In addition, the Mt. Clemens rule was not textually imposed, but an
interpretive gloss on the FLSA, and thus the Court was by no means
compelled to keep that interpretation. As noted above, the Court has
been more than willing to bend substantive law to fit the day in court
ideal.270 Indeed, Justice Thomas, writing in dissent in Tyson, criticized
the majority for not only misinterpreting Mt. Clemens, but relying "on
Mt. Clemens . .. given that decision's shaky foundations."271
The Tyson Court's Rules Enabling Act observation makes sense if
one does not situate the "substantive right" in the right to an
individualized adjudication, but in the right to overtime pay guaranteed
by the FLSA. The Court subtly signaled this shift in discussing Mt.
Clemens:
The Court in Mt. Clemens held that when employers violate their
statutory duty to keep proper records, and employees thereby have
no way to establish the time spent doing uncompensated work, the
'remedial nature of [the FLSA] and the great public policy which it
embodies... militate against making' the burden of proving
uncompensated work 'an impossible hurdle for the employee."'272
Here the Court not only relied upon the evidentiary rule set forth in Mt.
Clemens, but the view of the relationship between procedure and
substance that informed that rule. Rather than view procedure as a right
in itself, the Court suggests, quoting Mt. Clemens, that certain
procedures have to give way if they would violate the "remedial nature
of [the FLSA] and the great public policy which it embodies."273
This shift in the relevant "substantive right" is further supported by
the Court's other statements concerning representative evidence in
269 It is worth noting that any attempt to prove a counterfactual will necessarily require
using representative evidence of others, so the Court's disgust in Wal-Mart is misplaced. See
Jonah B. Gelbach, The Triangle of Law and the Role of Evidence in Class Action Litigation, 165
U. PA. L. REV. 1807 (2017).
270 See supra Section I.D.4 (discussing disparate treatment claims under Wal-Mart).
271 Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1057 (Thomas, J., dissenting).





general. In Shady Grove, the plurality suggested that an individualized
adjudication was a "substantive right" in any context. In contrast, the
Tyson Court pointed out that the permissibility of using representative
evidence "will depend on the purpose for which the sample is being
introduced and on the underlying cause of action."274 This context-
specific approach suggests that the permissibility of using representative
evidence may change with the substantive right at issue. It follows that
the relevant substantive right is not a trans-substantive right to a day in
court, but will depend on the substantive law at issue in a given case.
The Tyson Court's shift in the relevant "substantive right" also
explains the Court's view that Tyson may have "invited error" by failing
to consider bifurcation and failing to challenge the admissibility of the
representative evidence at trial. If the substantive right is an entitlement
to a "day in court," then Tyson could not have possibly invited error-it
was merely asserting its right to a day in court. But if the right is,
instead, the right to overtime pay, then the insistence on individualized
procedure looks less like an assertion of rights and more like an effort to
manipulate procedures to avoid liability.275
Indeed, the very source of the "representative evidence" rule in Mt.
Clemens was the employer's own failure to keep records, that this failure
"'militate[s] against making' the burden of proving uncompensated
work 'an impossible hurdle for the employee."'276 Accordingly, the
Court in Mt. Clemens, and now in Tyson, views individualized
procedures not as an ideal to be protected but, at least in this context, a
procedure capable of causing its own mischief. In other words, the
Tyson Court not only failed to consider the day in court an entitlement,
but considered it a problem in certain contexts.
Understood in this way, Tyson upends the exceptional view of the
class action. Rather than view the class action as an exception to an
idealized day in court entitlement, the majority in Tyson held that the
class action can be a solution to the dysfunctional consequences of the
day in court entitlement in this context. Thus, the Tyson Court strongly
implies that the day in court ideal is not an ideal at all, and that all
274 Id. at 1049.
275 See Sergio J. Campos, Changing Course, 65 KAN. L. REv. 1025, 1047 (2017) (making the
same point).
276 Id. at 1044 (citing Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1047).
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procedures should be measured by how well they effectuate the policies
of the underlying substantive law.
Indeed, understanding Tyson in this way provides a lens for
understanding the Court's positions in both Campbell-Ewald and
Spokeo, the two cases that served as bookends to Tyson last term.
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, Justice Scalia's last class action case,
concerned a class action brought by recipients of unsolicited text
messages against the marketers who sent them.277 In Campbell-Ewald,
the Court squarely addressed the issue hinted at in Symczyk-whether
an unaccepted offer of judgment to the class representative prior to class
certification made the proposed class action nonjusticiable.278 Although
the thrust of Symczyk suggested that the answer was yes, the Court
nevertheless hesitated, concluding that the class representative had
standing because the offer was unaccepted, and thus, there remained a
live controversy.279 According to the Court, an offer to settle did not
moot the case because "[u]nder basic principles of contract law,
Campbell's settlement bid and Rule 68 offer of judgment, once rejected,
had no continuing efficacy."280
Much has been made of Campbell-Ewald's dicta suggesting that
"the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of
the plaintiffs individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and
the court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount."281 This
dicta suggests that the decision in Campbell-Ewald, at best, stalls the
inevitable result that a defendant can moot a class action with an
unaccepted offer.
But more important is the majority's response to the dissent's
argument that allowing standing here "transfers authority from the
federal courts and 'hands it to the plaintiff."'282 The dissent, authored by
Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, pointed out
277 Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 667 (2016).
278 Id. at 667-68.
279 Id. at 671.
280 Id. at 670.
281 Id. at 672; see also Seamus C. Duffy, Campbell-Ewald-The 'Offer of Judgment' Saga
Continues, LAW360 (June 13, 2016, 11:29 AM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/
80 58 4 5 /
campbell-ewald-the-offer-of-j udgment-saga-continues [https://perma.cc/X6ZS-T9EK] (noting
that, because of this dicta, "[t]his won't be the last word on offers ofjudgment in class actions").
282 Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct. at 672.
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that Gomez, the representative plaintiff, was offered all that he was
seeking, and that "[a]lthough Gomez nonetheless wants to continue
litigating, the issue is not what the plaintiff wants, but what the federal
courts may do."283 The Campbell-Ewald majority responded by citing
precedent in a different context in which the Court rejected an attempt
to use a settlement to withdraw a judgment under appellate review to
"relieve[] [the defendant] from [an] adverse decision."284 just as the
Court "rejected this gambit," the Court rejected the attempt made by
Campbell-Ewald "to avoid a potential adverse decision, one that could
expose it to damages a thousand-fold larger than the bid Gomez
declined to accept."285
Although this response is brief, it is also in line with the departure
from the exceptional view seen in Tyson. Like in Tyson, the majority in
Campbell-Ewald recognized that adherence to the day in court ideal may
have adverse consequences and may lead to strategic manipulation.
Thus, just as an insistence on asserting individualized proof may allow
an employer to avoid paying overtime, the insistence on a "live"
controversy could have the effect of allowing a defendant to prevent "a
would-be class representative [from being] accorded a fair opportunity
to show that certification is warranted."286 Indeed, although
commentators have discussed the potential for defendants to use
settlement offers to "pick off' class representatives for some time,287 this
is the first time the Court cited this possibility in deciding a case. While
the Court in Symczyk mentions this "pick off" strategy, it did not inform
the reasoning of its holding.288
283 Id. at 682 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
284 Id. at 672 (majority opinion) (citing U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513
U.S. 18, 25 (1994)).
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 See Daniel A. Zariski, Leonard J. Feldman, Malaika M. Eaton & Darin M. Sands,
Mootness in the Class Action Context: Court-Created Exceptions to the "Case or Controversy"
Requirement of Article III, 26 REV. LITIG. 77 (2007) (discussing cases in which the court has
responded to pick off strategies).
288 Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 70 (2013) (noting that, on appeal, the
Second Circuit concluded that the case was not moot because "calculated attempts by some
defendants to 'pick off named plaintiffs with strategic Rule 68 offers before certification could
short circuit the process, and, thereby, frustrate the goals of collective actions.").
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A similar de-emphasis on ideal procedures and a concomitant
sensitivity towards substantive law can be seen in Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins.289 In Spokeo, the purported class representative sought relief for
damages caused by inaccurate information about the representative
disseminated by Spokeo in violation of federal law.290 Like Campbell-
Ewald, Spokeo concerned whether the class representative had Article III
standing, with the Ninth Circuit concluding that the representative had
standing because his injury was particularized as to him.291
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Spokeo Court
disagreed, concluding that while the representative alleged a
particularized injury, he did not necessarily allege a "concrete" injury.
29 2
The Spokeo Court noted, in particular, that while Congress is
empowered to define injuries, the Court must independently determine
whether the injuries in fact caused harm, noting that "[a] violation of
[the federal statute's] procedural requirements may result in no
harm."293
At first glance, the Spokeo Court does not seem all that sensitive to
the effectuation of substantive law. In reversing the Ninth Circuit on
standing, the majority undermined private enforcement of the federal
law at issue, or at least slowed it down.294 But like in Tyson and
Campbell-Ewald, the majority displays sensitivity to the objectives of
substantive law that is not possible under the exceptional view.
Specifically, Spokeo emphasizes and reaffirms "Congress' role in
identifying and elevating intangible harms," suggesting a deference that
is missing in cases like Wal-Mart or Italian Colors, where the Court
squeezed federal rights through the filter of the day in court ideal.295
289 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
290 Id. at 1544.
291 Id. at 1544-45.
292 Id. at 1548-49.
293 Id. at 1550.
294 See id. at 1556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that "I therefore see no utility in
returning this case to the Ninth Circuit to underscore what Robins' complaint already conveys
concretely: Spokeo's misinformation 'cause[s] actual harm to [his] employment prospects"').
295 Id. at 1549 (majority opinion).
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D. The Functional View
Taken together, Tyson, Campbell-Ewald, and Spokeo not only
depart from the exceptional view of the class action, but provide the
outlines of an alternative, functional view of the class action. This
alternative view has three features that are in direct contrast to the
features of the exceptional view.
First, under this alternative, functional view, there is no ideal
procedure. Accordingly, there is no preference for the day in court ideal
that serves as the foundation of the exceptional view. In fact, under this
functional view, procedures can be seen as either useful or harmful
depending on the circumstances. The same individualized procedures
that the Court sought to elevate in Wal-Mart, AT&T, and Comcast were
recognized as having potentially harmful consequences in Tyson and
Campbell-Ewald. Conversely, the class action is not seen as an
"exception" in need of justification, but stands on equal footing with
other procedures. In other words, the class action is not per se
exceptional" the way it is under the exceptional view.
Second, under this functional view, the parties are not entitled to
an idealized procedure, or any other procedure. Instead, the parties are
only entitled to a procedure that effectuates the rights at issue in a given
context. This is most clearly seen in Tyson, where the Court invoked Mt.
Clemens to support the use of representative evidence and class
proceedings because the normal process of individualized adjudication
would result in the employer not having to pay overtime. It follows that
a party is not entitled to a procedure if the procedure, no matter how
ubiquitous, would undermine the objectives of the substantive law.
Accordingly, the procedures that a party is entitled to will depend on the
context-on what the Tyson Court called the "purpose for which the
[the procedure] is being introduced and on the underlying cause of
action."296 In sum, this functional alternative would not pose an
existential threat to the class action, but would embrace the class action
as a potentially useful tool in the right context.
Third, under the functional view, no view of procedure defines the
scope or content of substantive rights. Instead, the Court stays, for the
most part, agnostic as to substantive rights, as suggested by the Court's
296 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1049 (2016).
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decision in Spokeo. Consequently, the Court would not use any
procedural picture as a prism to understand substantive rights, or define
certain procedures as the substantive right. Instead, the Court will look
at the substantive law itself and defer to the objectives the law has
chosen. Even in this deference, the Court would be empowered to shape
procedures to ensure that these rights are effectuated.
III. THE UNCERTAIN PATH AHEAD
A. Recent Cases
Although the three class action cases decided during the October
2015 term provide support for a functional alternative, the Court is by
no means compelled to adopt this view. Indeed, one can imagine the
Court limiting Tyson to its holding that procedures in a class action are
permitted if they are permitted in an individual case. Doing so would
preserve both the exceptional view and the other "grandfathered in"
deviances that characterized the Court's approach to class actions prior
to the 2015 Term.
The Court appears to be taking this path given its most recent class
action decisions. One such case, Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, concerned the
narrow issue of whether an appeals court could exercise jurisdiction to
review a denial of class certification in that case.
29 7 Because a class
certification decision, one way or the other, is not a final judgment, a
party typically cannot appeal such a decision until a final judgment has
been entered.298 Moreover, in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, the Court
rejected the "death knell" doctrine, which permitted an appeals court to
entertain an interlocutory appeal concerning the denial of class
certification if the denial resulted in the "death knell" of the litigation.
299
297 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017).
298 Id. at 1706 ("Orders granting or denying class certification, this Court has held, are
'inherently interlocutory,' hence not immediately reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which
provides for appeals from 'final decisions."') (internal citations omitted); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (2018) ("The courts of appeals... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States.").
299 437 U.S. 463, 466, 470 (1978).
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But given the impact a class certification decision can have on both
the viability of the plaintiffs' claims300 and the defendant's potential
liability,301 in 1998 the Rules Advisory Committee promulgated Rule
23(0.302 Rule 23(f) permits a party to seek permission from the court of
appeals to file an interlocutory appeal of a class certification decision.303
Rule 23(f) itself does not articulate the standard an appeals court must
use in reviewing such a petition. However, the notes accompanying
passage of Rule 23(f) noted that whether an appeal is permitted is within
"the sole discretion of the court of appeals."304
In Microsoft, the plaintiffs sought certification of claims arising
from an alleged defect in Xbox 360 consoles manufactured by
Microsoft.305 The actual case was preceded by prior litigation asserting
the same defect, but that litigation settled when class certification was
denied.306 This case was subsequently filed after an intervening Ninth
Circuit decision made class action law more favorable for the plaintiffs,
but the district court struck the class allegations, concluding that the
prior class certification denial controlled.307 Consistent with Rule 23(f),
the representative plaintiffs sought permission to appeal the denial,308
but the court of appeals denied permission.309
The representative plaintiffs then did something creative. They
agreed to voluntarily dismiss their claims with prejudice, thereby
allowing a final judgment to be entered in the case.310 Thereafter, the
300 Id. at 473 (noting that the death knell doctrine "may enhance the quality of justice
afforded a few litigants").
301 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (entertaining a
writ of mandamus challenging the grant of class certification, noting that because of the grant
of class certification the defendant "will be under intense pressure to settle.") (citing sources).
302 See Microsoft, 137 S. Ct. at 1706.
303 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) ("A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or
denying class-action certification under this rule ... [if] a petition for permission to appeal is
filed with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order is entered.").
304 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) Advisory Committee note to 1998 amendment.
305 Microsoft, 137 S. Ct. at 1710 ("The named plaintiffs . . . asserted that the Xbox scratched
(and thus destroyed) game discs during normal game-playing conditions.").
306 Id.
307 Id. at 1710-11.





representative parties solely appealed the district court's striking of the
class action allegations, contending that, if their appeal prevailed, they
would have the option to revive their claims in a class action.
311
Although Microsoft stipulated to the voluntary dismissal, they took the
position that the representative plaintiffs could not appeal the district
court's order.312 The Ninth Circuit concluded that they had jurisdiction
over the representative plaintiffs' appeal and ultimately "held that the
District Court had abused its discretion in striking [the] class
allegations," taking no position on whether the plaintiffs "should prevail
on a motion for class certification."313
The Microsoft Court concluded that the representative plaintiffs'
use of a voluntary dismissal to appeal the district court's order
constituted an impermissible end run around Rule 23(f). Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the majority, concluded that such a voluntary
dismissal would, "even more than the death-knell theory, invite[]
protracted litigation and piecemeal appeals."314 Although the case would
be over if the plaintiffs lost on appeal, the Court surmised that "plaintiffs
with weak merits claims may readily assume that risk, mindful that class
certification often leads to a hefty settlement."315
Moreover, because plaintiffs after a voluntary dismissal could
appeal as a right, it would "undercut[] Rule 23(f)'s discretionary
regime."316 Here, the Court was particularly influenced by an amicus
brief filed by a group of civil procedure scholars that included a member
of the Rule Advisory Committee that promulgated Rule 23(f).317 Finally,
the Court noted that the tactic, like the "death knell" doctrine, only
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 1712 (internal quotation marks omitted).
314 Id. at 1713.
315 Id.
316 Id. at .1714 ("Rule 23(f) reflects the rulemakers' informed assessment" and "[t]hat
assessment 'warrants the Judiciary's full respect."') (internal citations omitted).
317 Id. at 1709 (citing Brief of Civil Procedure Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017) (No. 15-457), 2016 WL 1128623, at
*12 (Mar. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Br. of Civil Procedure Scholars]). One of the authors, Thomas
D. Rowe, Jr., "served on the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure for the Judicial
Conference of the United States during the period when Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f)
was considered and adopted." Br. of Civil Procedure Scholars, 2016 WL 1128623, at *1.
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permitted plaintiffs to appeal, and this "one-sidedness... reinforce[s]
our conclusion that [it] does not support appellate jurisdiction."318
At first glance, the decision in Microsoft utilizes a pragmatism that
is similar to the Court's decisions in Tyson and Campbell-Ewald. Just as
the Court acknowledged the possibility of "pick off' strategies in
Campbell-Ewald, the Microsoft Court was alert to the way that voluntary
dismissal may constitute an end run around Rule 23(f). Indeed, this
concern with the Rule 23(f) regime seemingly blinded the majority to
the obvious fact that the appeal in Microsoft was not interlocutory.
Although the plaintiffs could have revived their claims if they won their
appeal, that is true of all appeals of judgments against plaintiffs. The
concurrence, authored by Justice Thomas and joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, rightly pointed out that a decision is "final"
under § 1291 if it "leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment," and "[t]he order here dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims
with prejudice and left nothing for the District Court to do but execute
the judgment."319
But this concern with pragmatics belies the true nature of the
Microsoft decision, which is more akin to Amchem than it is to Tyson. A
clue can be found in the author of the opinion, Justice Ginsburg, who
also authored Amchem. Just as Amchem was anchored in an
interpretation of Rule 23(b)(3), the Microsoft decision is largely an
exercise in deference to the designers of Rule 23(f). As the decision itself
states, as to interlocutory appeals of class action orders, "Congress chose
the rulemaking process to settle the matter, and the rulemakers did so
by adopting Rule 23(f)'s evenhanded prescription. It is not the
prerogative of litigants or federal courts to disturb that settlement."320 In
deferring the issue rather than tackling it directly, the Microsoft Court,
at best, is agnostic as to the functional view outlined in Tyson and
Campbell-Ewald.
But deferring to the rulemakers in Microsoft may have at least had
the advantage of stalling the proponents of the exceptional view from
reasserting it. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas agreed that the
318 Microsoft, 137 S. Ct. at 1715 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476
(1978)).
319 Id. at 1716 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233
(1945)).
320 Id. at 1715.
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voluntary dismissal was a "final order," but nonetheless argued that the
appeals court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the
representative plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. In particular, Justice
Thomas reasoned that "[w]hen the plaintiffs asked the District Court to
dismiss their claims, they consented to the judgment against them and
disavowed any right to relief from Microsoft," and "[t]he parties thus
were no longer adverse to each other on any claims."321
In coming to this conclusion, the concurrence failed to
acknowledge, let alone cite, Supreme Court precedent that permitted a
representative with a mooted claim to appeal the denial of a class
action.322 This prior precedent is especially significant because, in
permitting such mooted parties to appeal, it relied upon the function of
the class action as "an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries
unremedied by the regulatory action of government."323 By ignoring this
precedent, the concurrence stood ready to reinstall the exceptional view
of class action, one that ignored functional concerns and focused on a
party's day in court. As put by the concurrence, "[c]lass allegations,
without an underlying individual claim, do not give rise to a 'case' or
'controversy."'324
While Justice Ginsburg stalled the re-assertion of the exceptional
view in Microsoft v. Baker, she may still be a supporter of the view. In
California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERs) v. ANZ
Securities, Inc., another recent class action case decided shortly after
Microsoft v. Baker, the Court considered whether a statute of repose can
be tolled by the filing of a class action.325 Specifically, the plaintiffs in
CalPERs were members of a class action filed within the statute of
repose, but opted out after the statute had run to file their claims
separately.326
321 Id. at 1717.
322 Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980); U.S. Parole Comm'n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980).
323 Roper, 445 U.S. at 339; see also Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 402-03 (1980) (highlighting "[tihe
justifications that led to the development of the class action," which "include[d] ... the
provision of a convenient and economical means for disposing of similar lawsuits, and the
facilitation of the spreading of litigation costs among numerous litigants with similar claims.")
(citing FED. R. CIv. P. 23 Advisory Committee notes to the 1966 amendments).
324 Microsoft, 137 S. Ct. at 1717.
325 CalPERs v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042 (2017).
326 Id. at 2048.
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In an older decision, American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,
the Court concluded that the filing of a class action could equitably toll
the statute of limitations of the class members' claims.327 The CalPERs
Court, however, concluded that equity cannot be extended to statutes of
repose. In a majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the author of
Tyson, the CalPERs Court concluded that statutes of repose
fundamentally differ from statutes of limitations because statutes of
repose "are enacted to give more explicit and certain protection to
defendants."328 Accordingly, equity could not support tolling because
"the purpose and effect of a statute of repose . .. is to override
customary tolling rules arising from the equitable powers of courts."329
In addition, the Court concluded that any concern with parties
inundating courts with protective filings of individual suits in class
actions is "overstated."330 Because "the very premise of class actions is
that "'small recoveries do not provide the incentive to sue separately,
"[m]any individual class members may have no interest in protecting
their right to litigate on an individual basis."331 Despite the nod to the
"very premise" of the class action, the CalPERs decision, much like the
Microsoft v. Baker decision, is more a statutory interpretation decision
than a class action decision.
However, also like Microsoft v. Baker, the CalPERs decision is
notable for its dissent, this time filed by Justice Ginsburg, the author of
the Microsoft majority opinion. The dissent, joined by Justices Breyer,
Kagan, and Sotomayor, disagreed with the majority's analysis "[g]iven
the due process underpinning of the opt-out right," citing Wal-Mart.332
Specifically, "[a]bsent a protective claim filed within [the statute of
repose] period, [class] members stand to forfeit their constitutionally
shielded right to opt out of the class and thereby control the prosecution
327 414 U.S. 538, 551-53 (1974).
328 CalPERs, 137 S. Ct. at 2049.
329 Id. at 2051.
330 Id. at 2054.
331 Id. Not everyone agrees. See David Freeman Engstrom & Jonah B. Gelbach, American
Pipe Tolling, Statutes of Repose, and Protective Filings: An Empirical Study, 69 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 92, 93 (2017) ("But simple math shows that even if protective filings are made in only a
small share of cases where they are possible, the ultimate result would be a substantial spike in
litigation in federal courts").
332 CalPERS, 137 S. Ct. at 2056 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363 (2011)).
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of their own claims for damages."333 By characterizing the right to opt
out as a due process right, Justice Ginsburg, as well as the three other
justices who signed onto her dissent, clearly signaled that they continue
to be strong supporters of an individual's day in court, and thus,
ostensibly, supporters of the exceptional view. But, like Justice Thomas's
dissent in Microsoft, the dissent in CalPERs does not have the full
backing of the Court.
The most disappointing recent case for the functional view is Epic
Systems Corp. v. Lewis, decided at the end of the October 2017 term.
3 34
Epic concerns whether class action waivers in employer arbitration
agreements violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).335 Section
7 of the NLRA provides that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-
organization... and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."336
Moreover, Section 8 of the NLRA prohibits an employer from
"interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or coerc[ing] employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed" in Section 7.337 At issue was whether the class
action waivers constitute a restriction on the right to "engage
in . . . concerted activities" protected under Section 7.
Epic presented a conflict between the policies of the NLRA and the
policies of the FAA, which the Court through its class waiver
jurisprudence has interpreted as embodying the day in court ideal. As
put by the Court in Italian Colors, an arbitration agreement containing a
class waiver is simply an "agree[ment] to arbitrate pursuant to th[e]
'usual rule,' and it would be remarkable for a court to erase that
expectation."338 Accordingly, Epic required the Court to make a
choice-to honor the substantive rights of the NLRA, as they did with
the FLSA in Tyson, or to further proliferate the "day in court" ideal that
the Court has already embedded inside the FAA. Indeed, the lower
courts who have addressed the issue have either focused on functional
333 Id. at 2057 (emphasis added).
334 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). Epic was a consolidation of three cases raising the same issue, but,
as the Court noted, "[t]he three cases before us differ in detail but not in substance." Id. at 
1619.
335 Id. at 1619-21.
336 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018).
337 Id. § 158(a)(1).
338 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 234 (2013).
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concerns339 or have focused on the FAA and its day-in-court
underpinnings.340
The Court ultimately sided with its existing arbitration
jurisprudence, although it did so largely as a matter of precedent. Justice
Gorsuch, writing for the majority, first addressed the argument that,
under the savings clause of the FAA, a court is not required to enforce
an arbitration agreement "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."341 Arguably, Section 7 of the
NLRA represents such a ground. But the Court rejected that argument,
noting that the FAA's savings clause "recognizes only defenses that
apply to 'any' contract," and, "by attacking (only) the individualized
nature of the arbitration proceedings, the employees' argument seeks to
interfere with one of arbitration's fundamental attributes."342 As in
Italian Colors, the Court relies upon Concepci6n, stating that
"Concepci6n's essential insight remains: courts may not allow a contract
defense to reshape traditional individualized arbitration by mandating
classwide arbitration procedures without the parties' consent."343 Here
again the Court further embeds the "day in court" ideal into its
definition of arbitration.
The Court also rejected the argument that the NLRA, passed after
the FAA, abrogates the FAA with respect to collective procedures. In
particular, the Court concluded that the NLRA and the FAA were not,
in fact, in conflict.344 It did so by interpreting Section 7 narrowly,
concluding that the "other concerted activities for the purpose
of. .. other mutual aid or protection" language of Section 7 only
"serve[d] to protect things employees 'just do' for themselves in the
course of exercising their right to free association in the workplace," and
not the "courtroom-bound 'activities' of class and joint litigation."345
339 See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 2016) (concluding that class
actions constitute concerted activity because "[c]ollective, representative, and class legal
remedies allow employees to band together and thereby equalize bargaining power").
340 See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 360 (5th Cir. 2013) (concluding that such
class action waivers are enforceable, as "[riequiring a class mechanism is an actual impediment
to arbitration and violates the FAA").
341 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
342 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. CL 1612, 1622 (2018) (emphasis added).
343 Id. at 1623 (emphasis added).
344 Id. at 1624.
345 Id. at 1625 (quotations omitted).
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The Court supported this narrow interpretation of Section 7 by pointing
to other provisions of the NLRA that focused on workplace activities
like strikes and picketing.346 It also pointed to other statutes that
explicitly address collective procedures, which Section 7 fails to do.
In fact, the Court pointed out that the specific claims at issue were
FLSA claims, the same ones at issue in Tyson, and that, despite the
express collective procedures in the FLSA, no court in the employment
context has prohibited class waivers in arbitration.347 Indeed, the Court
highlighted that "this Court has heard and rejected efforts to conjure
conflicts between the Arbitration Act and other federal statutes," citing,
among other cases, Italian Colors.348 The Court even quoted Italian
Colors for the proposition that Rule 23 was an "exception to the 'usual
rule' of 'individual' dispute resolution."349
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg sought to counter the Court's
interpretation of the NLRA by discussing the history of the Act,
emphasizing that "the Court forgets the labor market imbalance that
gave rise to . .. the NLRA, and ignores the destructive consequences of
diminishing the right to employees 'to band together in confronting an
employer."'350 The dissent then showed the importance that Congress
attached to protecting concerted activities, and further showed how
Section 7 has not been limited to the workplace, and has, in fact, been
extended to litigation.351
The dissent then made an interesting historical point about the
scope of the FAA that explains the NLRA's failure to address arbitration
procedures. The dissent first noted that the FAA was passed to permit
arbitration in commercial disputes where the parties were of roughly
equal bargaining power, and that language was added in Section 1 of the
346 Id.
347 Id. at 1626 (citing cases); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
32 (1991) (permitting arbitration for Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims); NLRB v.
Alternative Entm't, Inc., 858 F.3d 393, 413 (6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (collecting cases demonstrating that "[e]very circuit to consider the
question" has held that the FLSA permits agreements for individualized arbitration).
348 Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1627 (citing cases).
349 Id. at 1628 (quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 234 (2013)).
350 Id. at 1633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S.
822, 835 (1984)).
351 Id. at 1637-38.
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FAA to prevent its application to employment contracts.352 However, in
2001 the Court subsequently interpreted Section 1 narrowly,353 and then
proceeded to apply the FAA to all employment contracts, with the
Court's decision in Concepci6n in 2011 causing an explosion in the use
of class waivers.354 Accordingly, the NLRA was silent on the issue of
class waivers when it passed, and the NLRB, in fact, did not address the
issue of class waivers in employment arbitration clauses until 2012.355
Despite noting that "the Court's Arbitration Act decisions have
taken many wrong turns," and that the decisions constitute an
"exorbitant application of the FAA,"356 Justice Ginsburg's dissent did
not call into the question the validity of these decisions. Instead, Justice
Ginsburg argued that the NLRA does not discriminate against
arbitration because "[a]t issue is application of the ordinarily
superseding rule that 'illegal promises will not be enforced.'357
Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg's dissent did lay some groundwork
for the functional view that is similar to Justice Kennedy's reasoning in
Tyson. In particular, Justice Ginsburg signaled some uneasiness with the
"exceptional" view by emphasizing the necessity of collective procedures
for the claims here, noting that "[e]mployers, aware that employees will
be disinclined to pursue small-value claims when confined to
proceeding one-by-one, will no doubt perceive that the cost-benefit
balance of underpaying workers tips heavily in favor of skirting legal
obligations."358
There are even glimmers of hope for the functional view in the
majority opinion. Despite relying upon Concepci6n and Italian Colors,
Justice Gorsuch in his majority opinion did not take a forceful stand in
favor of the exceptional view. The majority made clear that "no party
352 Id. at 1642-43; see also 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) ("[N]othing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce.").
353 Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1644 (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109
(2001)).
354 Id. at 1644 & n.12 (citing sources).
355 Id. at 1644-45.
356 Id.
357 Id. at 1646 (quoting Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 77 (1982)).
358 Id. at 1647-48.
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has asked us to revisit" this precedent.359 Instead, the majority opinion
has a conservative (small c) bent, appealing not to policy but to the
constraints of precedent. Indeed, Justice Gorsuch concluded the
majority opinion by writing that "[t]he policy may be debatable but the
law is clear."360
B. The Allure of Individualism
Despite her uneasiness with the "exceptional view" in Epic, Justice
Ginsburg's dissent in CalPERs shows that the "day in court" ideal still
has some grip on how she and other justices think about the law of due
process. This, combined with Justice Thomas's dissent in Microsoft v.
Baker, demonstrate that the "exceptional" view is not going away any
time soon.
Part of the appeal of the "day in court" ideal is that it identifies a
talismanic right that provides an easy answer to difficult procedural
questions. In Microsoft v. Baker, for example, it is far from clear when a
federal court is permitted to exercise appellate jurisdiction over a
judgment reached through voluntary dismissal. In the past the Court
has not looked kindly at efforts to avoid jurisdiction to avoid unhelpful
precedent,361 So it stands to reason that the Court also would not look
kindly on efforts to create appellate jurisdiction.362 Nevertheless, it is far
easier to consider the issue of whether the named plaintiffs have a
mooted claim or not. Similarly, in CalPERs, it is not clear whether
statutes of repose are limited by a filed class action. But it is clear
whether or not a party had a "day in court" through a right to opt out.
359 Id. at 1630-31 (majority opinion).
360 Id. at 1632.
361 See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994) (permitting
vacatur of judgment on appeal as moot because of a settlement between the parties only when
"the public interest would be served by a vacatur") (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki
Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
362 One interesting exception is United States v. Windsor, where, after a judgment in its
favor, the defendant United States declined to defend it on appeal. In a majority opinion
written by Justice Kennedy, the Court agreed that the appeal was justiciable given that the
United States refused to pay the damages owed to Windsor, the availability of amici to
articulate views defending the judgment, and the importance of the issue. See United States v.
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 759-61 (2013).
[Vol. 40:22232294
CLASS ACTION LAW
As an added bonus, this procedural "right" is transubstantive-it applies
in all substantive settings, from product defect cases like Microsoft v.
Baker to securities cases like CalPERs.
But I think the primary appeal of the exceptional view is the
compelling nature of the "day in court" entitlement. It not only chooses
a right for purposes of legal analysis, but chooses a right that is easy to
defend in many situations. The idea of a "day in court" evokes the need
felt by parties to make sure that their underlying rights are
acknowledged and respected by the court. One way to know that one's
rights are respected is to afford victims a right to seek redress when
those rights are violated.363 Indeed, such a "day in court" right is akin to
the rights of petition and expression protected by the First Amendment,
and thus can be understood as an implication of democratic self-
government.364
Defenders of the class action have pushed back against this
exaltation of the day in court by discussing the regulatory objectives of
the class action.365 But by appealing to such abstract, public objectives as
a justification, the class action opens itself up to claims that it is an
undemocratic procedure promulgated by the courts themselves, and
thus cannot obtain the same type of public legitimacy that, for example,
a legislatively-enacted administrative scheme can achieve.366 More
importantly, appealing to the group to override the interests of the
individual is precisely the evil that the exceptional view fights against.
What is appealing about the functional view at the heart of a
decision like Tyson is that it takes the premises of the exceptional view
363 See John C.P. Goldberg, Inexcusable Wrongs, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 502-03 (2015) ("It
is no coincidence that torts are wrongs with victims, and that tort suits are brought by victims.
Tort law is largely about victims' rights: the right of potential victims not to be injured, and the
right of actual victims to respond to their injury.").
364 Martin Redish is most associated with this view. See MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE
JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT
136-37 (2009) (arguing, in the context of class actions, that "the due process version of litigant
autonomy grows out of the same constitutional grounding as the First Amendment right of free
expression").
365 See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, A Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims, 70 VAND. L. REV. 221
(2017); Glover, supra note 14; Resnik, supra note 14.
366 This view is most associated with the late Richard Nagareda. See, e.g., Richard A.
Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfield Revisited, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 603, 605 (2008) (arguing that class actions should be designed consistent with
"institutional boundaries on regulatory power").
2019] 2295
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
seriously. It does not look to the group to justify a diminution of the
rights of the individual, but takes seriously what it means to protect
those rights. In doing so, the functional view takes seriously not only the
right to be heard, but the primary right that the "day in court" is meant
to protect. More importantly, it identifies situations where the "day in
court" does more harm than good to that primary right.
By recognizing that a "day in court" can be harmful, the functional
view is, at heart, a modern one. The harm that a "day in court" can cause
is largely a side effect of the prevalence of mass production. The harm
that mass production can inflict calls into question the efficacy of
existing procedures because the response to such mass harm requires
coordination among victims that a "day in court" can hinder.367 It is not
a coincidence that collective procedures that are exemplified by the class
action arose shortly after the dawn of the industrial revolution.368
Indeed, the class action, like the administrative state in general, began to
arise in prominence precisely to deal with modern situations where the
"day in court" cannot secure the rights it seeks to protect.
36 9
C. Back to the Future
In many ways, the law of personal jurisdiction is ground zero for
our various understandings of the class action. The "usual rule" that the
class action is an "exception" can be traced back to Pennoyer v. Neff,
367 See David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentives to Invest in Litigation and the
Superiority of the Class Action, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 305 (2014) (showing the superiority of the
class action in dealing with the transaction costs that arise among numerous plaintiffs asserting
common issues against a defendant).
368 See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An
Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1571 (2004) (discussing this
history).
369 See Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit,
8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686-87 (1941) (noting that "[a]dministrative law removes the obstacles of
insufficient funds and insufficient knowledge by shifting the responsibility for protecting the
interests of the individuals comprising the group to a public body which has ample funds and
adequate powers of investigation," but, given imperfections in administrative law, the authors
"explor[ed] the possibilities of revitalizing private litigation to fashion an effective means 
of
group redress" through class actions); see also Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 497, 497 (1969) (discussing Rule 23(b)(3) category, which was amended
in 1966 to help vindicate "the rights of groups of people who individually would be without
effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all.").
[Vol. 40:22232296
2019] CLASS ACTION LAW 2297
which gave birth to personal jurisdiction law and which has tortured
many first-year law students ever since.370
It therefore should come as no surprise that Tyson relies so heavily
on Mt. Clemens, which was decided during an era when the Court was
much more willing to question classic procedural precedents like
Pennoyer to address new problems arising from industrialization.371 In
fact, Mt. Clemens was decided one year after International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, where the Court famously sought to modernize the law of
personal jurisdiction away from Pennoyer's focus on "presence" within a
state to one that took into account the substantive impact and fairness of
a court's exercise of jurisdiction.372 Moreover, four years after Mt.
Clemens, the Court decided Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., a case that was, in many ways, a more pointed rebuke of
Pennoyer.373
But Mullane is especially relevant here because, like Tyson, it
contains an entire view of due process within it. Accordingly, Mullane
shows that, like Pennoyer for the exceptional view, the functional view
has its own ancestor. Mullane involved a New York state statutory
scheme authorizing the creation of common trust funds, essentially a
trust consisting of other, smaller trusts, allowing the "donors and
370 For example, in Italian Colors, the Court cites Califano v. Yamasaki for the proposition
that "[The class action is] 'an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on
behalf of the individual named parties only."' Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S.
228, 234 (2013) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)). But this "usual
rule" can be traced further back to Hansberry v. Lee, where the Court stated matter-of-factly
that "[i]t is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not
bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to
which he has not been made a party by service of process." 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940). And, of
course, in support of this proposition, the Hansberry Court cited Pennoyer v. Neff. See id.
(citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)).
371 Indeed, it is no surprise that a labor case like Mt. Clemens provided such procedural
innovation. One recent article has argued that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure itself arose
from advances in labor law. See Luke P. Norris, Labor and the Origins of Civil Procedure, 92
N.Y:U. L. REV. 462 (2017).
372 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (permitting a court to consider "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice").
373 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950) (rejecting the petitioner's reliance on the in rem/in personam
classifications set forth in Pennoyer, concluding that "we think that the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution do not depend upon a classification for
which the standards are so elusive and confused generally and which, being primarily for state
courts to define, may and do vary from state to state.").
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testators of moderately sized trusts" to achieve the economies of scale of
common trust administration.374 As part of the statutory scheme, New
York law permitted the periodic settlement of all claims against the
common trust fund trustee, where the "decree in each such judicial
settlement of accounts [was] made binding and conclusive."375 The
settlement proceedings would be publicized via newspaper notice, and
that was the only notice the parties would be afforded.376
At one such proceeding, the court-assigned guardian for the
beneficiaries challenged the personal jurisdiction of the state court over
the out-of-state absent plaintiffs.377 But in taking up the case, the Court
did not address the issue of personal jurisdiction.378 Instead, the Court
conceived of the issue as one of notice, and stated, consistent with the
exceptional view, that "[t]he fundamental requisite of due process is the
opportunity to be heard."379 The Court then ruled that due process only
required notice "reasonably calculated" to apprise the absent parties of
the proceedings, a ruling that remains the law today.380
But, in applying this rule, the Mullane Court held that the
newspaper notice provided for in the statutory scheme would be
sufficient for those contingent interests who did not have a known
address. The Court reasoned that requiring more would "dissipate [the]
advantages" of common trust fund administration.
3 81 As for those with
known addresses, the Court held that mail notice was sufficient, as the
statutory scheme anticipated the mailing of income to these parties.
382
374 Id. at 307-08 (noting that through the creation of such common fund trusts
"diversification of risk and economy of management can be extended to those whose capital
standing alone would not obtain such [an] advantage").
375 Id. at 309.
376 Id. at 309 ("The only notice given beneficiaries of this specific application was by
publication in a local newspaper in strict compliance with the minimum requirements of N.Y.
Banking Law § 100-c(12).").
377 Id. at 311 ("We are met at the outset with a challenge to the power of the State-the right
of its courts to adjudicate at all as against those beneficiaries who reside without the State of
New York.").
378 The Court would finally address the issue of personal jurisdiction over absent, out-of-
state plaintiffs in Shutts, the case most cited for the view that an opt out right is a due process
right. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
379 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
380 Id. at 314.
381 Id. at 317-18.
382 Id. at 318.
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The Court further noted that "notice reasonably certain to reach most of
those interested in objecting is likely to safeguard the interests of all,
since any objections sustained would inure to the benefit of all."383
Despite echoing the exceptional view in stating that a "fundamental
requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard," the actual
holding in Mullane contemplated that some parties would not get their
day in court. Indeed, in discussing the sufficiency of mail notice, the
Court acknowledged and accepted that mail notice posed "reasonable
risks that notice might not actually reach every beneficiary."384 But the
Mullane Court was comfortable with this result because it did not
adhere to the exceptional view. In fact, the Mullane Court prefaced its
due process analysis by stating that it should consider the "vital interest"
the state has in establishing such common fund trusts, concluding that
"[a] construction of the Due Process Clause which would place
impossible or impractical obstacles in the way could not be justified."385
Thus, the Court in Mullane did not consider due process in the abstract,
but tailored it to the substantive objectives the procedures at issue were
meant to protect.386 This is also the animating ethos of Tyson and the
alternative, functional view it presents.
By recognizing those situations where a "day in court" would be
absurd, cases like Mt. Clemens, Mullane, and Tyson add a contextual
complexity that the "day in court" ideal lacks. But they also bring
procedure down to the ground, to ensure that overtime is paid, and that
the benefits of common trust administration are available for those with
modest trusts. Indeed, the 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which resulted in the modern federal class action, were
quite explicitly "intended to shake the law of class actions free of
abstract categories .. . and to rebuild the law on functional lines
383 Id. at 319.
384 Id.
385 Id. at 313-14.
386 See Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REv. 965, 976 (1993) ("As can
be seen most clearly in his unwillingness to impose a requirement of actual notice, [Justice
Jackson's] fundamental concern [in Mullane] was to render the common trust a viable financial
instrument, and for that purpose, he was prepared to compromise certain individualistic values
and to allow what I have called a representation of interests.").
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responsive to those recurrent life patterns which call for mass litigation
through representative parties."387
If Microsoft v. Baker, CalPERs, and Epic are any indication, it is
unlikely that the Court is ready to resume that approach. By focusing on
statutory interpretation, as the majorities did in all three cases, the
Court adopted a "minimalism"388 at odds with the active role in
protecting rights envisioned by the Court in Mt. Clemens and Mullane.
And perhaps there are structural reasons for that modesty that justify
it.389
But decisions like Tyson make clear the real human cost of that
modesty. Indeed, they reveal the overall emptiness of the exceptional
view. The "day in court" is a valuable procedural right, but it is valuable
because it protects other underlying rights. Under the exceptional view,
however, the "day in court" ideal is used to diminish the very rights that
make procedures like a day in court so valuable in the first place.
CONCLUSION
In Epic, the Court declined to reassess their allegiance to the
"exceptional view" embedded in their arbitration decisions and, to a
certain extent, a failure to act is an affirmation of that view. But Justice
Ginsburg's dissent in Epic provides some hope that functional concerns
may again prevail in a future case, that the channel dredged in cases like
Tyson and Campbell-Ewald may one day direct the Court towards a
greater appreciation of the functional view. After all, as evidenced by
Mt. Clemens and Mullane, the Court has been awake to functionalism
before.
387 Kaplan, supra note 369, at 497.
388 See Owen M. Fiss, The Perils of Minimalism, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 643 (2008)
(criticizing such minimalism).
389 For a good discussion of these structural concerns, see Glover, supra note 365, at 266-75.
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